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Abstract
IT-ENABLED COORDINATION IN ELECTRONIC MARKETS:
AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL
COMMUNICATION ON GROUP BUYERS
by
ALEXANDER PELAEZ
Adviser: Dr. Karl R. Lang
Coordination, and the mechanisms by which coordination occurs, represents a significant
area of study for economic research, and information technology. Technology enhances
communication in both speed and quantity of information and when aligned with appropriate
tasks can improve decision-making and task performance. Examining the effect of technology
based coordination mechanisms on market platforms provides insight into outcomes as
represented by buyer surplus and task completion as well as behaviors, such as network structure
and emotional attitudes in economic experiments. Drawing on theory from economics and
information systems, larger buyer groups should be able to obtain better prices and extract higher
surplus from sellers, and in the presence of higher levels of communication, buyers should be
better able to coordinate their actions, yielding higher surpluses as predicted by countervailing
power theory. However, increased communication, while allowing for more collaboration,
requires increased coordination. Thus, while larger groups should get better outcomes the
complexity of forming groups proves challenging. The increased levels of communication create
“noise” which hinders the time it takes to complete tasks thereby suppressing buyer profits.
Galbraith (1952) explained that increased cooperation among buyers would lower prices, but that
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these lower prices were found in the establishment of intermediaries, through countervailing
power theory. However, individual consumers could never exercise this power, because
coordination and communication costs were too high.
This dissertation tests countervailing power theory under a specific economic market,
group buying suited for interdependent tasks. An experimental simulation is created that tests the
effects of different levels of communication and group size, and examines the results of buyer
surplus and time to task completion as well as their interaction effects. The experiment also
examines the structural nature of the group-buying network and analyzes the rich qualitative data
for insight into the role of emotions in group buying. The results could be used to further design
additional experimental simulations to tests these classic economic theories while provide insight
into the design of electronic markets.
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1. Introduction
Coordination, and the mechanisms by which coordination occurs, represents a significant
area of study for economic research, and information technology (Malone and Crowston, 1994;
Clemons and Row, 1992). Clearly, technology enhances communication in both speed and
quantity of information and when aligned with appropriate tasks can improve decision-making
and task performance (Dennis et al., 2008). Examining the effect of technology based
coordination mechanisms on market platforms should yield interesting results. This research
seeks to examine outcomes and behaviors through the creation of a technology based group
buying economic experiment.
Drawing on theory from economics and information systems, larger buyer groups should
be able to obtain better prices and extract higher surplus from sellers, and that more
communication capacity should help buyers with coordinating their actions. However, increased
communication, while allowing for more collaboration, requires increased coordination. Thus,
while larger groups should get better outcomes the complexity of forming groups may prove to
be difficult. The increased ability to communicate may also hinder the time it takes to complete
tasks. Galbraith (1952) explained that increased cooperation among buyers would lower prices,
but that these lower prices were found in the establishment of intermediaries, through
countervailing power theory. However, individual consumers could never exercise this power,
because coordination and communication costs were too high. Technology greatly enables
individual consumers to communicate and exert pressure on sellers, and thus it may be found that
consumers can exercise this power through newer technologies such as social media, and
markets such as group buying, or social shopping.
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Social buying, or group buying, presents a new form of social commerce (Liang and
Turban, 2012) and has attracted a fair amount of attention from business worldwide since early
2000s. Industry examples of group-buying businesses include early ventures like Mercata, which
ceased operation by 2004, as well as more recent ones like Living Social and Groupon. The
nascent market of online group buying is still evolving and companies continue to innovate both
new group-buying technology platforms and business models. The market has grown strongly
over the past few years, in particular in the United States and China. For example, Groupon,
which was founded in 2008, has gone through a rapid rise, expanding business globally and
generating $1.6b revenue in 2011, but at the same time has also been struggling to find a
sustainable business model (Anand and Aron, 2003). By focusing on the design of the
technology platform, from the perspective of the buyers, outcomes and behaviors can further be
studied and the potential value of introducing a new social technology feature on a group-buying
platform can be explored.
The theoretical foundation of IT-enabled coordination motivates the current study. The
creation of a technology based social buying experimental market allows us to view and examine
the effect social communication on group-buying platforms as a form of an IT-enabled
coordination mechanism.
Historically, various IT-enabled coordination innovations have had a profound impact on
market structure and seller-buyer relations in different industries. For example, Malone et al.
(1987) advanced the idea that electronically coordinated B2B markets will tend to increase
market transparency and reduce the role of intermediaries while Brynjolfsson and Smith (2003)
showed empirically that electronically coordinated B2C markets reduce transaction costs and
lead to lower consumer prices. Clemons et al. (1993) argued that IT-enabled coordination
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reduces monitoring cost in supply chains and likely leads to more outsourcing and to the
development of strategic partnerships with key suppliers. Porter (2001) theorized that the
adoption of the Internet as a coordination platform would tend to shift bargaining power from
sellers to buyers. Clemons (2008) posited that social commerce technologies like online
communities, recommendation systems, and consumer ratings and reviews increase consumer’s
knowledge about products, availability and prices. This leads to consumers demanding steeper
compromise discounts, decreasing consumers’ willingness to pay for products that are useful to
them but do not perfectly meet their individual preference and taste. Finally, Zwass (2010)
concluded that web 2.0 based coordination platforms foster collective effort by users in order to
co-create consumer value.
The literature on IT-enabled coordination looks specifically at the impact of an IT
innovation on a specific market and finds that new IT-enabled coordination tools and
mechanisms lead to significant changes in market structure (e.g., level of vertical integration,
role of intermediaries, bargaining relationships) and market performance measures (e.g.,
economic efficiency, price and profit levels, transaction costs, transparency levels). Juxtaposing
theoretical arguments among economists about the bargaining power of buyer groups and group
coordination create the environment by which the effect of technology enabled coordination
mechanisms can be closely examined with respect to outcomes and the behaviors of individuals
and groups.
Based on analytical results using economic modeling, researchers have suggested that
improving the coordination and cooperation process among group buyers should result in higher
welfare for both buyers and sellers (Chen, et al. 2009; Jing and Xie, 2011; Liang, et al. 2012).
Empiricists are also showing interest in group-buying related issues (Kaufmann, et al. 2010;
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Kaufmann and Wang, 2001; Lai, et al. 2006), but none of the currently available studies has
specifically investigated how communication capacity among buyers affects group-buying
performance. Adding communication capacity can affect both individual users’ attitudes and
group performance. The presence of reciprocal communication can positively influence
cognitive and affective involvement of individual users (Jiang, et al. 2010), and increasing media
synchronicity among group members can improve group coordination (Dennis, et al. 2008;
Huang and Benyoucef, 2013).
Platform sponsors, who control the platform design, need to be aware that increased
social facilitation (and communication support for the buyers) may present risk of buyer
collusion to sellers, and leading to defection by the buyers or sellers. Through the inclusion of a
competitive arousal model for decision-making under time pressure on a group-buying platform
based on Ku et al (2005) one of the studies proposed in this paper, extends the research to a
group level, instead of individual as designed by Ku et al. (2005), and the introduction of the
social facilitation mechanism whereby the communication channel possibly enhances
competitive arousal, testing for effects of social facilitation on task completion and time to
completion.
Finally, this paper borrows from sociology and psychology through the inclusion of the
concept of interdependence. In the prescribed model, the buyers must work together to extract
surplus from the market. In the absence of any cooperation, buyers receive no reward.
Interdependency theory helps formulate an understanding of coordination by defining the ways
in which social relationships shape both intrapersonal and interpersonal processes (Rusbult and
Van Lange, 2002). It helps categorize the situations people encounter when coordinating activity
and relates the situations to their relevant goals and motives (Rusbult and van Lange, 2002).
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Interdependence theory provides dimensions by which to classify situations in which
dependence occurs. The first four dimensions are a) level of dependence, b) mutuality of
dependence, c) basis of dependence, and d) covariation of interests (Rusbult and van Lange,
2002). In collective buying, buyers have a high level of dependence since buyers bid for a
product at the same price and all buyers within the group are required to commit to the purchase.
Second, there is a high degree of mutuality due to the fact that no one buyer is more important or
can exert more influence than others, assuming all buyers are working to maximize their value
and have no other motives.
Similarly, the covariation of interests states that each buyer has corresponding outcomes
and benefits. Finally, the basis for dependence relies on joint control and “tend to yield
adaptation in the form of coordination” (Rusbult and van Lange, 2002). Joint control produces
ability-driven traits and behaviors, and unlike partner control, governed by rules of convention
instead of morality-based decisions (Rusbult and van Lange, 2002). Thus, in group-buying
situations, it could be concluded that buyers will work together from a profit-maximizing, utility
standpoint, as opposed to non-utility based motives.
Collective buying, like other auction mechanisms, has a very strong temporal dimension,
i.e. buyers must wait until enough members in a group have agreed to make a bid.
Interdependence theory predicts that buyers may be influenced, not only by immediate outcomes,
but predictions of future outcomes or consequences of outcomes as a consequence of interaction
(Rusbult and van Lange, 2002). Time constraints impact market participant’s behavior in group
buying, especially at the start and ending period of auction (Kaufman and Wang, 2001), thus the
temporal dimension of the interdependency structure must be factored. By analyzing the
dimensions in the theory better predication can be made regarding the behaviors to determine if
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the buyers are truly interdependent. Manipulating both the design of the IT artifact, i.e. inclusion
of communication and coordination mechanisms, as well as manipulating the buyers reward
mechanism, through the inclusion of financial incentive payments will provide greater insight
into the outcomes and behaviors of these interdependent buyers.
1.1 Research Questions
By using the theories from experimental economics, IT coordination, and psychology this
research seeks to fill the preceding literature gap by conducting three empirical studies exploring
outcomes and behavioral effects of the IT enabled coordination on markets.
Specifically, this research addresses some general research questions, as follows:

Study 1: What is the impact of group size (larger vs. smaller) and communication capacity level
(high vs. low) on group performance in terms of economic welfare (buyer surplus) and group
coordination (task completion time)?
Study 2: Under competitive conditions and time pressures, how are buyer’s outcomes affected
and how do their behaviors change in terms of bidding and or use of communication.
Study 3: This study examines the structure of the group using social network analysis to
determine if certain characteristics of the network, i.e. centrality measures of actors in a network,
group formation, coordination or performance.
Study 4: This study investigates the message data collected from the use of the social
communication tool to examine the communication patterns of the buyers in order to better
understand how the communication effects their bidding activity with respect to group formation
coordination or performance.
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This paper first proposes to utilize an IT artifact in which an experiment is created to
examine the outcomes and behaviors of by manipulating group size and communication on
group performance in terms of buyer surplus and group coordination using a social buying, or
group buying, market mechanism. The second paper examines the role of competition in a
similar market through changes in the design of the IT artifact.
Next, the third study will alter the design of the interface under guidelines set forth for
economic experiments and more recently advocated for information systems studies. This study
will also have dynamic group formation. Finally, the last study investigates the message data
collected from the use of the social communication tool to examine the communication patterns
of the buyers. The richness of the data will allow for an exploration of how users' group-buying
behavior and performance is affected by the adoption of new technology capabilities.
Study 1
Economic Theories
IT Theories
Psychology Theories

Study 2

Study 3

Study 4

Countervailing Power
Auction Theory
Induced Value Theory
Media Synchronicity Theory
Task Technology Fit
Group Formation
Interdependence Theory
Social Presence, Trust, Drive Theory

Primary Focus

Buyers surplus & Group Formation

Key Elements

Buyers, social commerce, communication mechanism, competition,
technology-design, network structure, message patterns

Design

2x2

2x2x2

1x2
SNA

Exploratory

Manipulations

Group Size,
Communication

Communication

Communication
Groupsize

Level of Analysis

Group / Ind

Competition,
Group Size,
Communication,
Group /Ind

Group /Ind

Ind

Table 1: Key Components for Research
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1.2 Key Concepts
Market (Social Commerce)
The quest to understand the potential effect of technological advances on economic
surplus and prices requires an exploration into the theoretical foundation of the interaction
between prices and information. For example, Hayek (1945) proposed that price signals in the
market contain all the information necessary for efficiency in the markets. Hayek’s point
regarding the uniquely critical role of prices has been a focal point for researchers for over 60
years, and at the time ran contrary to two prevailing theories of competitive equilibrium (Smith
1982). First, the price-taking hypothesis stated that competitive equilibrium can only be achieved
in the presence of a large number of buyers and sellers, making individual deviations immaterial,
thus making prices constant (Cournot, 1838). Second, competitive equilibrium can only be
achieved under the complete information assumption, the presence of perfect knowledge of the
conditions affecting supply and demand (Samuleson, 1966). Hayek’s premise provides a
different and unique perspective that researchers would vigorously test, whereby these
conditions, need not, necessarily, be present.
The notion of solving power issues in economic markets also represents a principle
concept in economic research. Solutions to economic power had traditionally been explained by
two major theories, the power of competition and regulation by the state (Rha and Widdows,
2002). However, Galbraith, in 1952, had presented an alternative solution, to problems of
economic power, called the Countervailing Power theory. He provided an explanation of the
evolution of countervailing power by stating that existence of strong buyers would evolve as a
response to aggregation of power by sellers, and furthermore that this evolution would “occur
not in lockstep but as a response to the other” (Galbraith, 1952).
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Economic experiments allow researchers to test theories and models (Smith, 1982). A
notable number of market experiments validated the Hayek Hypothesis showing that neither
price taking nor complete information was necessary to achieve competitive equilibrium in an
oral double auction (Smith, 1982). Providing more empirical evidence on these and other
economic theories is the cornerstone of economic experiments, as opposed to theoretical
economic modeling.
Similarly, a number of economic experiments on countervailing power have been
conducted including the supply and demand curves for products were common knowledge
(Davis and Wilson, 2008), and a small number of buyers influencing monopolist pricing (EngleWarnick and Wilson, 2005). Noting the difficulty of exerting countervailing power, Galbraith
(1952) stated that any countervailing power exercised by consumers would manifest itself
through intermediaries such as wholesalers and retailers, who could more easily organize.
This research focuses on developing an economic experiment using a social buying or
group buying market. Social commerce generally refers to e-commerce activities that are
supported with social technology platforms or social media tools (Huang and Benyoucef, 2013;
Liang et al., 2012; Liang and Turban 2012). Online group-buying represents a social commerce
example that uses a market mechanism in which customers with similar interests but diverse
demands participate in generating collective orders with volume price discounts (Kaufman et al.,
2010). Thus, the simulation created will attempt to simulate a buyer-initiated intra-auction
group-buying model. It should be noted that the experiments conducted in the following chapters
represent a narrow branch of IT enabled markets, i.e. group buying, or social commerce, are a
much broader set of diverse markets. By conducting the study in this manner, it allows us to
study and discuss key variables, and while we cannot generalize to all electronic markets and
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designs the findings might have some implications that will help enhance the understanding of
the interaction between buyers and sellers.
IT Enabled Market
This study focuses primarily on the effect IT-enabled coordination within a market. The
economic theories presented by Hayek and Galbraith, represent the core of how the design of the
IT artifact was perceived. First, as Hayek (1947) notes, price he believed was all that was needed
to communicate changes in the market. Second, Galbraith (1952) believed that power of sellers
could be countermanded through coordination, but that this coordination could never occur at a
consumer level, since the coordination required was too complex.
By exploring various ways to create an IT-enabled market, theories can be tested using
economic experiments. Current technology, e.g. internet and more specifically, group buying
platforms, create IT artifacts whereby communication is more easily facilitated and information
transfer can be richer (Daft and Lengel, 1986), allowing us the opportunity the effect on prices
and buyer behaviors based on the economic theories above.
This research views social communication on group-buying platforms as a new form of
an IT-enabled coordination mechanism. The literature on IT-enabled coordination looks
specifically at the impact of an IT innovation on a specific market and finds that new IT-enabled
coordination tools and mechanisms lead to significant changes in market structure (e.g., level of
vertical integration, role of intermediaries, bargaining relationships) and market performance
measures (e.g., economic efficiency, price and profit levels, transaction costs, transparency
levels). Prior literature provides insight by categorizing different types of tasks in which IT
enabled communication can affect the outcomes of the tasks.
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Media Synchronicity Theory (MST) posits that communication is enhanced when a
technology provides the proper level of synchronicity, defined as the “state in which individuals
are working together at the same time with a common focus” (Dennis, et al. 2008). Media higher
in synchronicity leads to better performance in convergence processes, whereby the objective of
reaching a common understanding and confirmed agreement is based on the individual’s
interpretation of the information, not the raw information itself (Dennis, et al. 2008; Lind and
Zmud 1991). In addition, media higher in synchronicity also seems to support the type of
coordination and collaboration predicted by interdependence theory, since the dimensional
structure matches higher joint control, high level of mutual dependence and higher levels of
covariation of interests which are governed by rules of convention, instead of morality-based
decisions (Rusbult and Van Lange, 2006), e.g. maximizing-utility.
By examining the impact of incorporating a novel IT-enabled coordination mechanism in
the design of an electronic group-buying platform, from the buyers’ perspective, the results
should supplement the existing theoretical foundations of IT enabled markets and provide
additional insight into the outcomes and behaviors.
Group Size
With respect to the selected market and examining the effect of communication on
exercising power, the review of the literature, focuses specifically on understanding the effect on
buyer performance in the presence of seller market power, operationalized via a collective
buying mechanism, in which the size of the groups and communication methods are
manipulated.
Previous experiments compared prices in a two-buyer and four-buyer experiment under a
duopoly posted-offer auction, and found that prices in the two-buyer model were lower than the
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four-buyer model (Ruffle, 2000). The explanation for the lower price was that if one buyer in the
two-buyer model withheld their demand, the two sellers would compete by lowering the price. In
the four-buyer case, three of the four buyers were required to withhold their demand for the
competition between sellers to take hold. Engle-Warrick and Ruffle (2006) would repeat the
experiment under a monopolistic posted-offer setting, and reached the same conclusion but they
posited that a monopolistic seller was more cautious in their posted offers with two buyers than
with four buyers.
This research explores the possibility that, first, a double auction, or variant, might reach
a different conclusion. Since demand in this experiment is controlled at one unit per seller,
demand withholding is removed, unlike Ruffle (2000) and Engle-Warnick and Ruffle (2006).
According to countervailing power theory, four-buyers should be able to exercise more power
than two buyers, therefore, this research predicts that under a double auction mechanism, i.e.
collective buying, buyers will be able to exercise more countervailing power. Using this prior
research, group size is held constant for these experiments at 2 and 4, which will be referred to as
small group and large group, respectively.
Communication Mechanism
Rha and Widdows (2002) studied how consumers actually organize to exercise
countervailing power, especially on the Internet. Forming successful coalitions of consumers
requires better organization and simplified communication. The Internet provides the means by
which communication and organization can occur more efficiently, breaking down demographic,
geographic, and temporal barriers (O’Leary and Cummings, 2007).
The communication process pertaining to the group-buying task represents an example of
a typical convergent process, which needs support for verification, negotiation, and clarification
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(Lind and Zmud, 1997). According to the theory of media synchronicity, a simple synchronous
communication channel like an instant messaging tool can provide a good fit for such
communication process needs (Dennis et al., 2008). With the appropriate communication tools,
group buyers should collaborate more effectively in order to reach consensus and achieve
common goals (Zigurs and Buckland, 1998). Hence, offering additional communication capacity
to the buyers should enable them to share more information and thus coordinate better bidding
strategies and consequently also obtain better deals compared to buyers groups without such a
communication mechanism.
Competition
Research on competitive interaction has shown that time pressure is a critical driver for
competition as it increases the need to make quick decisions and decreases the consideration of
the consequences (Kaufman et al., 2010; Lai et al., 2006; Malone et al., 1987). Introducing
competition allows for the study of decision-making under pressure of online consumers (using a
particular setting; an electronic group buying platform).
Social facilitation, in this research represented as the group of buyers in the experiment,
can heighten the effects of competition, can increase dominant responses and can enhance
performance on salient tasks (Hammond, 1986; Porter, 2001). Competitive emotions and
increased dominant responses are more apparent in larger groups than smaller groups and thus
differences are expected between the larger groups and smaller ones in the presence of
competition (Zajonc, 1965).
Group Formation
According to interdependence theory, more information is required to remove ambiguity,
however, under certain conditions such as collective buying, information transmission, requiring
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less cognition, would be required. Rha and Widdows (2002) postulated that the Internet was a
perfect medium for group buying because of its ability to increase communication and
coordination. When individuals are reliant on others for their outcome, more information and
increased communication should result in more efficient group formation (Rusbult and
VanLange, 2006). Increasing communication capacity should enable buyers to share more
information and thus coordinate better with the member of their buyer group in comparison to
groups without the added communication mechanism.
The type of task has been shown to be important for group formation, and as such, this
research uses Media Synchronicity Theory as the framework to understand the effect of
technology to enhance task performance within virtual teams. Convergence processes, e.g. group
buying, are enhanced with media that is high in synchronicity, i.e. faster and simpler (Dennis et
al., 2008) Thus, exploring the method of communication in a collective buying environment
seems logical. Based on the literature, information is a necessity for groups to form and commit
to a purchase. Utilizing this concept, along with interdependence theory, the addition of
enhanced communication should enable buyers to share more information and form groups faster
(Rusbult and VanLange, 2002).
Research Model
Based on the key elements of the dissertation, each study uses an experimental simulation
designed according to the best practices for economic experiments as prescribed by Smith
(1984). Each of the studies varies some element of the experiment in order to provide some
replication of the experiment and thus strengthen, validate, or repudiate prior results. Variations
include slight changes in the way groups are formed, providing incentives or the introduction of
competition.
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The basic research model is to examine the relationship between the manipulated
variables of communication channel and group size on buyer surplus and time to task
completion.

Figure 1: Overall Research Model
Each study varies the basic model slightly to examine more closely the effect of the
manipulation. Further, following the principles of economic experiments as prescribed by Smith
(1994), each study seeks to reinforce the results of the previous studies. The first study focuses
on the effect on economic performance in terms of buyer surplus, and task coordination
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represented as time to task completion by manipulating group size and the presence of a
communication channel, as well as possible interactions.
In the second study, the experiment introduces competition, and examines the interaction
effects between all of the variables, and examines the nature of the messages exchanged between
participants. Furthermore, the study seeks to examine the overall effect of competition on
winning, and posits that that introducing competition will not only decrease the failure rate of the
tasks, but also further, that it will negatively effect buyer profits and increase the time for groups
to form. Further, the study seeks to examine the interaction effects with the inclusion of
competition.
The primary focus of the third study will determine the effects of redesigning the
interface slightly to add a richer interface with slightly more information provided to the bidder.
This study also introduces induced value on the subject for performance payouts. The study will
attempt to replicate the results of the previous studies, however social network analysis
techniques will be employed in an effort to determine how centrality, betweenness, and degree of
a network impacts average buyer profit, and time to task completion, i.e. successful bid.
Finally, the last study aggregates the message data from all the previous studies. The
richness of the information provided in the messages between buyers can provide significant
insight into how buyers use the communication channel to increase profits or speed up their time
to task completion, i.e. successful bid. The study will look at how emotions affect performance,
and further, the study will examine how users who only communicate pricing information fare in
terms of average buyer surplus and time to completion.
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2. Social Buying: The Effects of Group Size and Communication on Buyer
Performance – Study 1
2.1 Introduction
Social buying, or group-buying, presents a new form of social commerce (Liang and
Turban, 2012) and has attracted a fair amount of attention from business worldwide since early
2000s. Industry examples of group-buying businesses include early ventures like Mercata, which
ceased operation by 2004, as well as more recent ones like Living Social and Groupon. The
nascent market of online group-buying is still evolving and companies continue to innovate both
new group-buying technology platforms and business models. Exploring new revenue streams
and experimenting with new technology features are the two principle drivers for business
change in this dynamic industry. This study focused on the latter of the two and examines,
mainly from the buyers’ perspective, the potential value of introducing a new social technology
feature on a group-buying platform.
From a theoretical perspective, the study is motivated by research on IT-enabled
coordination, viewing social communication on group-buying platforms as a new form of an ITenabled coordination mechanism. The literature on IT-enabled coordination looks specifically at
the impact of an IT innovation on a specific market and finds that new IT-enabled coordination
tools and mechanisms lead to significant changes in market structure (e.g., level of vertical
integration, role of intermediaries, bargaining relationships) and market performance measures
(e.g., economic efficiency, price and profit levels, transaction costs, transparency levels). The
aim of the present study is to add to this body of research by examining the impact of
incorporating a novel IT-enabled coordination mechanism in the design of an electronic groupbuying platform, initially from a buyers’ perspective.
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There have been theoretical arguments among economists about the bargaining power of
buyer groups and group coordination since at least the 1920s, predominantly saying that larger
buyer groups should be able to obtain better prices from sellers but that coordination costs
among buyers may offset price advantages when buyers do not already have established
relationships (Galbraith, 1952). Yet, in the absence of modern information and communication
technology, Galbraith at the time also argued that advantages of group-buying in practice were
essentially limited to corporate buyers in large-scale procurement and supply chains, while they
were largely unavailable to consumers because of the difficulty for them to coordinate buying
decisions, especially given their differences in product attribute preferences and product
valuations. Recent advances in digital technology, however, have enabled the development of
online platforms that do in fact support coordination of consumers on a large scale.
Commercial group-buying platforms support various forms of social buying. These platforms
differ in how groups form, what kinds of deals are offered, what group size thresholds are
required to make deals, how group buyers can communicate with each other and what social
features are supported, and how prices are determined. Group size and communication capacity
are hence two salient features for the design of group-buying models from both a theoretical as
well as a practical perspective.
Based on analytical results using economic modeling, researchers have suggested that
improving the coordination and cooperation process among group buyers should result in higher
welfare for both buyers and sellers (Chen et al., 2009; Jing and Xie, 2011; Li et al., 2004).
Empiricists are also showing interest in group-buying related issues (Kaufman et al., 2010;
Kaufman and Wang, 2001; Lai et al., 2006), but none of the currently available studies has
specifically investigated how communication capacity among buyers affects group-buying
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performance. Adding communication capacity can affect both individual users’ attitudes and
group performance. The presence of reciprocal communication can positively influence
cognitive and affective involvement of individual users (Jiang et al., 2010), and increasing media
synchronicity among group members can improve group coordination (Dennis et al., 2008;
DeSanctis and Poole, 1994).
Thus, the present research explores specifically the impact of group size (larger vs.
smaller) and communication capacity level (high vs. low) on group performance in terms of
economic welfare (buyer surplus) and group coordination (task completion time).
The experiments proposed in the laboratory adapt the buyer-initiated intra-auction
group-buying model (Chen et al., 2009). It is expected that group size will have positive effects
on buyer profits and larger groups should extract more surpluses on average than smaller groups.
It is also expected that there will be a negative impact of group size on group coordination in
terms of time to task completion. In general, adding communication capacity should hinder task
completion, and this effect should be stronger for the larger groups than the smaller ones due to
increased complexity.
Ultimately, this study examines the possible tradeoffs between the benefits from ITenabled coordination capabilities and its associated costs due to increase task complexity, which
raises the question of how to manage consumer interactions on social buying platforms.
2.2 Theoretical Perspective and Hypothesis Development
Social commerce generally refers to e-commerce activities that are supported with social
technology platforms or social media tools (Huang and Benyoucef, 2013; Liang and Turban,
2012; Liang and Turban, 2012). Online group-buying represents a social commerce example that
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uses a market mechanism in which customers with similar interests but diverse demand regimes
participate in generating collective orders with volume price discounts (Kaufman et al., 2010).
The present group-buying study looks at two important dimensions of group
performance, economic performance and group task performance, from the buyer perspective.
Group profits indicate monetary payoffs for the group buyers, while task performance measures
indicate how well the buyers in a group coordinate to accomplish the group tasks of agreeing on
a joint offer and making a deal with the seller. Examining how group size and communication
capacity affect group performance, the study draws on two principal streams of research to
theoretically ground the research and develop specific hypotheses. The economics literature is
used to theorize the relationship between buyer group size and buyer surplus generated in the
market. Second, media synchronicity theory and task complexity theory are utilized to theorize
the effect of communication capacity and information availability on group coordination.
Group Buyer Profit
Countervailing power theory provides us with the theoretical basis to understand how
group size and communication capacity can affect, the arguably most important aspect of groupbuying performance, group profit (i.e., total buyer profits, or buyer surplus). Galbraith (1952)
presented countervailing power theory, stating that unbalanced economic power can be “held in
check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it” and that the existence of
coordinated buyers would evolve as a response to aggregation of power by sellers. Researchers
have found that buyer concentration is a source for countervailing power, which can lower seller
margins and accrue more surplus at the buyers’ side (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Galbraith
originally focused on the buying consortiums of his time and noted that large buying groups
were able to resist actions by monopolistic sellers. Galbraith recognized that it was theoretically

	
  

	
   20	
  

possible for consumers to exercise some form of direct countervailing power, too, but pointed
out that it would be unrealistic to expect it to occur in practice at any significant level because of
the difficulty for them to coordinate effectively. But nonetheless, consumers could realize some
of these benefits indirectly, through intermediaries (Galbraith, 1952). Rha and Widdows (2002)
extended this view to electronic commerce settings.
Economists have confirmed this kind of benefit to consumers when large retailers
exercise countervailing power (Lustgarten, 1975; Schumacher, 1991) and pass some of the
achieved cost savings on to their customers. By providing quantity discounts, group-buying sites
attempt to aggregate disparate and asynchronous buyers, with buyers benefiting from lower
prices (and thus higher buyer profits) and sellers benefiting from increased economies of scale
(Anand and Aron, 2003). However, retail intermediaries can be replaced with electronic groupbuying sites, for some purchases, since online consumers can interact more easily (Malone et al.,
1987). Similarly, Porter (2001) has argued that the Internet has the potential to increase the
bargaining power of buyers. Moreover, Parameswaran and Whinston (2007) and Rezabakhsh et
al. (2006) have suggested that the shift of bargaining power to consumers will be stronger in
social commerce environments based on Web 2.0 architectures, such as social buying settings,
than in standard Internet commerce environments. Recent economic experiments on
countervailing power have shown that even a small number of buyers can influence monopolist
pricing, concluding that group size matters. Ruffle (2000), for example, showed that markets
with two buyers (smaller groups) attained lower prices than those with four buyers (larger
groups). Thus, the first hypothesis:

	
  

	
   21	
  

Hypothesis 1 (Group-Size—Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Increasing the group size of buyers in
a group-buyer model will tend to increase buyer surplus.

Rha and Widdows (Rha and Widdows, 2002) studied how consumers actually organize to
exercise countervailing power, especially on the Internet. Forming successful coalitions of
consumers requires better organization and simplified communication. The Internet provides the
means by which communication and organization can occur more efficiently, breaking down
demographic, geographic, and temporal barriers (O’Leary and Cummings, 2007).
The communication process pertaining to the group-buying task represents an example of
a typical convergent process, which needs support for verification, negotiation, and clarification
(Lind and Zmud, 1991). According to the theory of media synchronicity, a simple synchronous
communication channel like an instant messaging tool can provide a good fit for such
communication process needs (Dennis et al., 2008) With the appropriate communication tools,
group buyers should collaborate more effectively in order to reach consensus and achieve
common goals (Zigurs and Buckland, 1998). Hence, offering additional communication capacity
to the buyers should enable them to share more information and thus coordinate better bidding
strategies and consequently also obtain better deals compared to buyers groups without such a
communication mechanism. Thus, the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2 (Communication-Capacity—Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Introducing a
communication channel for buyers to exchange private messages will tend to increase buyer
surplus.
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Assuming heterogeneous consumer preferences in terms of different willingness-to-pay
(WTP) values held by buyers introduces some conflicts of interest. For example, high-WTP
buyers, that is, buyers who are willing and able to pay a higher price for a product, may want to
bid to increase the chances for an offer to get accepted by the seller, while low-WTP buyers may
not be able or willing to follow suit and drop out of a group bid. Evidently, bigger groups
encounter more such interest conflicts than smaller groups. Group buyers can coordinate better
bidding strategies if they can recognize those conflicts and reach consensus within the
constraints of the low-WTP buyers in order to not jeopardize possible deals. Of course, in some
cases, a deal that is acceptable to all may still be difficult to negotiate, or simply not be possible
at all. Introducing a communication channel among buyers should help buyers recognize WTP
related conflicts and move their group level price threshold towards a feasible level. The more
potential conflicts are present among buyers, the more important the communication channel
should be for mitigating them. Moreover, the effect of the communication channel on increasing
group profit should become more salient in bigger groups than in smaller groups. Hence,
theoretically, in accordance with Baron and Kenny (1986), the communication channel, not only
serves as a predictor for buyer profits but also as a moderator between group size and buyer
profit by strengthening the effect of group size. Therefore, the following interaction effect
between group size and communication level is proposed in hypothesis 3:

Hypothesis 3 (Communication-Capacity & Group-Size Interactions on Buyer-Surplus
Hypothesis): The positive effective of introducing a communication channel for buyers to
exchange private messages on buyer surplus will become more salient in bigger groups than in
smaller groups.
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Group Task Completion
The second dimension of group performance considered task completion, and primarily
how fast the members of a group can complete the task of generating their first joint offer to the
seller. This involves decisions to join a group bid and to negotiate a jointly agreed on bidding
price. Time to task completion is strongly connected with task complexity. Theory suggests that
task complexity is best conceptualized from three interdependent perspectives—psychological
experience, task-doer interactions, and objective task characteristics (Campbell, 1988). When
task performance is regarded as a psychological experience, the doer’s motivation, the level of
stimulation, and potential arousals during the performance of the task should be taken into
account (Taylor, 1981).
The task-doer interaction relationship focuses on the doer’s cognitive limitation and task
related proficiency (Shaw, 1976; Hammond, 1986). Objective measures for complexity can be
constructed from the number of information sources and the degree of information diversity that
the people who are involved in performing a task are confronted with (Steinmann, 1976).
Importantly, both group size and communication capacity can change the nature of a task and
thus change task complexity (Campbell, 1988). Enlarging the group size can substantially
increase the information input to the task performance process, and hence increase task
complexity. Introducing a private communication channel will allow the buyers to acquire more
information through exchanging messages instead of merely observing the market movement on
the trading platform. Working on more complex tasks, groups should need more time to reach
consensus.
Compared with a bigger group, a smaller group deals with fewer divergent WTP values,
and thus less information that needs to be processed by the group members as well as fewer

	
  

	
   24	
  

WTP related bidding conflicts that need to be resolved. On the other hand, coordination
becomes more complex as the size of the group increases. For example, Chen et al. (Chen et al.,
2009) have shown that technology provides, in principle, effective communication in intraauction bidding clubs, but coordination becomes increasingly more difficult as the member base
grows, leading to the 4th hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4 (Group-Size—Task-Completion Hypothesis): Increasing the group size of buyers
will tend to delay group task completion.

Similarly, making a buyer communication channel available on the group-buying
platform introduces a new information source to the buyers, in addition to the publicly posted
bidding prices, and one which can make WTP related conflicts more transparent. On the one
hand, the new information can help buyers coordinate more effective bidding strategies by better
recognizing the different pricing constraints. But on the other hand, some of the shared
information may be irrelevant to the task or even incorrect. Processing the additional information
also presents a higher cognitive load for each buyer, and consequently may lead to longer
processing time before completing the group task. The information exchange among the buyers
increases their mutual interdependency, which tends to help them work out better coordinated
outcomes (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002), but also increases task complexity and may make the
buyers more cautious in announcing their individual offer prices (Campbell, 1988; Steinmann
1976). Therefore, the following is hypothesized.
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Hypothesis 5 (Communication-Capacity—Task-Completion Hypothesis): Introducing a
communication channel for buyers to exchange private messages will tend to delay group task
completion.

Furthermore, because buyers in bigger groups face more potential conflicts, when they
deal with more diverse WTP values than those in smaller groups, they are likely to exchange
more information through the communication channel than those in smaller groups in order to
manage conflicts and reach agreements. The information exchanges in larger groups, dealing
with increased levels of potential interest conflicts, are also likely to create more emotional
pressure than in smaller groups and stimulate arousal among buyers, thus increasing the
cognitive challenges they face (Campbell, 1988; Taylor, 1981) and decelerating the group
decision-making process. The relationship conflicts, pertaining to feelings, tension and friction,
will further slowdown the task completion process, and especially in more complex tasks (De
Dreu and Weingart, 2003). Therefore, it is proposed that there is an interaction effect between
communication and group size with regard to task completion.
Hypothesis 6 (Communication & Group-Size Interactions on Task-Completion Hypothesis):
Introducing a communication channel for buyers to exchange private messages will delay the
group task completion in bigger groups more than in smaller groups.

2.3 Methodology
Experimental Design
Using a specific variant of the buyer-initiated intra-auction group-buying model proposed
by Chen et al. (Chen et al., 2009), the economic experiment creates electronic social buying
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market in the laboratory where participants are asked to coordinate group purchases of a single
product from a monopolistic seller. Each individual buyer is given a demand of one unit with a
pre-assigned unique willingness-to-pay value. These valuations vary across buyers, thus
modeling heterogeneous consumer demand preferences. Buyers are pre-assigned to groups. The
experimental environment is developed using the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and was
implemented in a Windows client-server networked environment. Z-tree is a software package
widely used in the economics field. Z-tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic
Experiments was originally developed at the Economics Department at the University of Zurich.
Participants were recruited from an undergraduate student subject pool and are
compensated with course credit in an introductory level information systems class. The study
uses a 2x2 factorial design in which two variables are manipulated, group size and
communication capacity, at two levels. First, group size was manipulated comparing smaller
groups with larger groups, and based on prior experimental research (Ruffle, 2000), smaller
groups are operationalized as 2-buyer groups and larger ones as 4-buyer groups. The second
manipulation compared low versus high communication capacity among buyers. At the high
level, communication capacity is operationalized by the inclusion of a communication channel as
a social technology feature on the buyer screen while no such communication channel is offered
at the low level. The communication mechanism resembles a standard chat box that is widely
known across many platforms.
As depicted in the flow chart (included as Appendix A), which shows the basic logical
sequence of the events and decisions in the experiment, buyer subjects can either place an
opening bid (the first proposed purchasing price to be offered to the seller) or join an already
existing bid within the group. However, a group offer is not routed to the seller until the required
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number of buyers (minimum buyer threshold) has joined the offer at the proposed bid price.
Hence, group bidding occurs in two stages, requiring the completion of two group tasks.
The first task involves proposing bids, among themselves, to determine an agreed joint
offer bid. The bargaining process with the seller begins after the first task has been completed
and a joint offer submitted to the seller. Successfully negotiating with the seller and making the
deal presents the second group task in our study. If the seller rejects an offer, the buyers need to
renegotiate a new, improved bid. This process continues until the seller either accepts an offer
and closes the deal (the group successfully completes the task) or the experimental round
terminates when time expires, without making a deal (the group fails to successfully complete
the task).
Procedure
Each session consists of groups with 1 seller (monopolist) and either 2 or 4 buyers. Upon
entering the lab, the participants were randomly assigned to computer terminals with a seller
screen for the seller and a buyer screen for the buyers. Once the participants are seated, they are
asked to review a set of instructions that explains the electronic group-buying mechanism and the
user interface for their specific role as either a buyer or a seller. Each session consisted of one
extended practice period and ten experimental periods, where buyers worked to coordinate group
offers to the seller. The data from the practice round was discarded and not used in the analysis.
Each regular round lasted 150 seconds.
The seller receives only finalized group bids, once a group has agreed on a joint offer.
The seller screen shows the group bid as the number of people who joined in the bid, the offer
price per unit, and the total amount of the offers (see Appendix D for an illustrative seller screen

	
  

	
   28	
  

shot). The seller then has the opportunity to accept the bid and thus terminate the current round,
or not. Buyers can work on a new, improved joint offer if their bid is not accepted.
While the seller user interfaces are simple, convenient, and very easy to use, the design of
the buyer screen was a bit more complex (as illustrated in Appendix D). It shows them their
assigned willingness-to-pay (WTP) value of the product they are asked to buy. With the
beginning of each round, a buyer can initiate a bid, or wait and join an existing bid price. When
all buyers in the group join a bid, a group offer was generated and immediately forwarded to the
seller for review. In any case, a new bid price can be proposed at any time. Buyers observe the
market by looking at the current bids, pending offers, and also by learning from declined offers.
In the treatment with a private communication channel buyers are able to exchange text
messages via an instant message type of communication box. No such communication channel is
available to sellers, nor can sellers see any of the messages in the communication between the
buyers.
When a transaction occurs, i.e. a seller accepts an offer from the buyer group (completing
group task 2), both the seller’s profit and buyer’s profit are calculated and shown to the
participants. Individual buyer profits (buyer surplus) are computed for each buyer as transaction
price less WTP value. Summing individual buyer profits over the members of a group yields
group profit. No profits accrued when a round ended with no bids accepted. The subject rewards
were not linked to task completion time.
In each period of the ten repeated rounds of the experiment, the buyers are given different
WTP values, generated randomly, and rotated to buyers sequentially in each period (as detailed
in Appendix B). First, 10 random integer numbers are generated between 25 and 100 from a
uniform distribution. These 10 numbers are then recorded and reused for all of the 10 repeated
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rounds for all experimental groups in order to experimentally control for WTP effects. In the
first round of the experiment, the first two (or four) numbers are assigned to the two (or four)
group buyers sequentially, and in the second round, the next two (or four) values, starting from
the second number, are assigned to the buyers sequentially, and so on. This WTP rotation
method ensures that every buyer gets to use all of the ten generated values over the course of the
ten repeated rounds and, additionally, that for any given round all buyers have also different
values.
Measures
The two experimental treatment variables, presence of the communication channel and
group size, represent the two independent variables in the study. Two dependent variables,
group-level profit, measured as average buyer profit within groups, and group performance are
also investigated in terms of time for group task completion. More specifically, the latter is
measured as the time a group needed to generate their first joint offer for the seller, which was
previously defined as the first group task. Because, the groups control this performance task, it
is chosen as the primary task performance indicator in the study. Performance of the second
group task is also measured, making a deal with the seller, by calculating the success rate of task
completion over the repeated rounds of the experiment as a secondary group performance
variable in the study. To control for round effects, the periods are modeled as control variables.
In addition, data is also collected on bidding and communication activities of the group buyers,
by observing the number of bids submitted and number of messages posted per buyer and group.
Group profits were normalized by group size as well as for average WTP within experimental
sessions to adjust for potential differences.
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2.3 Data Analysis
Descriptive Analysis
The experiment was carried out with a total of 45 groups. Each group had one seller and
either two or four buyers. Data from each group was collected in one session over 10 rounds of
bidding. The design represents a typical 2 x 2 experiment with repeated measures. The
descriptive analysis of the experimental data is summarized in table 2. Of the 450 rounds of
potential deal making by the 45 groups, 296 final bids from 44 groups were successful and
accepted by sellers, and 154 rounds were unsuccessful and failed to produce a winning bid. Due
to inconsistent show-up rates of the recruited subjects at the lab for the scheduled experiments,
some planned sessions had to be cancelled, resulting in an unbalanced experimental design.

Group
Size 2
Group
Size 4

Without Communication
With Communication
Completion
Completion
# Bids Buyer Profit
# of Bids Buyer Profit
Time
Time
(Groups)
(Groups)
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
85
94
40.7 10.3 16.7 12.5
37.0 10.4 20.0 20.2
(11)
(13)
75
42
41.8 7.8 24.5 21.0
40.2
7.1
41.5 34.9
(12)
(8)

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Successful Rounds of Bidding
One of the groups in the treatment with four buyers and without a communication
channel exhibited total group performance failure and did not generate any successful bids. In
the rounds that did not generate a sales transaction, groups failed for two reasons. Either the
buyers could not agree on a common bid to form a group offer (failure to complete the first
group task) or the submitted bids were too low and rejected by the seller (failure to complete the
second group task). Periods with unsuccessful bids were removed from the main analysis. On
average, buyers in the larger groups outperformed their counterparts in the smaller groups in
both treatments, with and without the communication channel. The descriptive analysis result is
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consistent with our Group-Size—Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis (H1), but formal testing will be
discussed later in the following section.
A nonparametric Spearman’s rho correlation analysis was conducted to check the
correlations between the major measures of the study (Table 3). The correlation between the two
dependent variables, group profit and time for group formation, is significantly negative, which
implies that more time spent on the preparation for the first bid does not necessarily mean higher
profit. The correlation analysis shows that communication capacity is negatively correlated with
buyer profit (p<0.01) and positively correlated with time for group task completion, (p<0.05).
Group size is positively correlated with both profit (p<0.1) and the time for group task
completion (p<0.01).

Time
CommCapacity
Group Size
Period
Number of Bids
Submitted

CommCapacity

Profit

Time

-.395**
-.191**
.088†
.132*

.117*
.254**
-.119*

-.163**
.039

.064

.069

-.111

-.187**

-.198

**

GroupSize Period

-.057

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
†

Regression significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).

Table 3. Spearman’s Rho Correlations

Figure 2: Buyer Profit

	
  

Figure 3: Time to Task Completion
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Number of group bids submitted, used as a proxy for degree of buyer initiative, is
negatively correlated with profit (p<0.01). This indicates how tactically buyers act in submitting
group bids, but also reflects how tough the seller is in terms of rejecting group bids. High
numbers of group bids submitted shows a lot of activity but could also mean that the buyer group
does not develop an effective bidding strategy over the course of the experiment.
The rank of the bidding period (1 to 10) is positively correlated with profit (p<0.05) and
negatively with time for group task completion (p<0.05). The correlation results indicate that
buyers in later rounds tend to generate higher profits in less time than in earlier rounds of the
experimental session. The trend lines of profit and time over the bidding periods are consistent
with the correlation analysis as represented in Figures 2 and 3. These results point to the possible
presence of learning effects, prompting us to incorporate the periods as control variables in the
following hypothesis testing.

Hypothesis Testing
Because rounds with unsuccessful deal-making attempts were treated as missing values,
an unequal sample size was obtained for the 2×2 design. In order to control for the effect of
repeated measures with unequal sample size, two sets of statistical examinations were applied.
First, multiple linear regression analysis was used for the main test. Second, a robustness test
followed using a mixed model analysis with maximum likelihood estimation to verify the results.
Thus, the following regression model was developed for our analysis.
Profit =α0 +

!
!!! 𝛼!

𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑! + α10GroupSize + α11CommCapacity +α12(GroupSize×CommCapacity) +ε1

(1)
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Time =β0 +

!
!!! 𝛽!

𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑! + β 10GroupSize + β 11CommCapacity +β12(GroupSize×CommCapacity) + ε2

(2)

Notes:
Profit: buyer surplus
Time: time to generate the first bid
αi, βi : regression Coefficients (i=0,1… 12)
Periodi: experiment period (i=1, 2…9)
GroupSize: group Size (bigger vs. smaller)
CommCapacity: communication Capacity (with / without communication box)
GroupSize×CommCapacity: interaction term of group size and communication capacity
ε1, ε2: error term

Main Test
Dummy variables were introduced to model group size (GroupSize) and communication
capacity (CommCapacity). Specifically, for the treatment with the smaller group size (2-buyer
model) GroupSize was coded as “0”, and for the larger group size, GroupSize=“1”. Likewise, the
treatment without communication channel CommCapacity was coded as “0”, and the treatment
with communication channel was coded as CommCapacity=“1”. Additionally, 9 dummy
variables were generated to represent the experimental periods 1 to 9, while “period” 10 served
as the reference measure. Two separate regression tests were conducted to analyze the main
effects of group size and communication capacity on the two dependent variables profit,
referring to the buyers profit, and time, referring to the first group bid generation time.
Combining the results of the two separate linear tests in table 4, shows buyer profit at the
group level, expressed as average profits of the buyers within a group, across the ten repeated
rounds (Profit) and the time for task completion (Time). In order to examine the contribution of
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each of the four treatments, a hierarchical multiple linear regression was conducted in four
stages, “Model 0”, “Model 1”, “Model 2”, and “Model 3”, in which the variables, Period,
CommCapacity, GroupSize, and the interaction effect (CommCapacity×GroupSize) were added.
The 9 dummy variables, Period1 through Period9 were included in the test to control for
the effect of repeated measurement, especially learning effects. According to Model 1, buyers in
bigger groups generated $2.4 more profit than in smaller groups (p < 0.05), contributing 1.5%
explanatory power. After adding presence of a communication channel as an independent
variable in the regression, the effect of group size on buyer profit was still positive, but only
moderately significant (p < 0.1) (Model 2), thus Group-Size—Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis (H1) is not
supported. Presence of the communication channel has a significant negative effect on buyer
profit, which interestingly, not only rejects Communication-Capacity—Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis
(H2), but also shows an effect that is actually opposite to the prediction. Based on the testing
results in Model 3, no significant interaction effect can be identified between communication and
group size on buyer profit.
M0

M1

M3

Profit

Time

Profit

Time

Profit

Time

Profit

Time

Intercept

42.7**

24.6**

41.5** 21.4**

43.2**

13.2**

43.7**

15.8**

Period1

-6.2*

11.4†

-6.2*

13.5*

-6.2*

13.6*

Period2

-4.3

†

Period3

-4.7†

Period4

-6.0*

11.8*

-2.1

-3.8

-1.9

-4.0

1.0

-4.0

.9

4.0

-4.3†

4.4

-4.6†

6.9

-4.6†

6.8

0.6

-4.7

1.0

-4.7

0.9

-2.5

0.9

-2.2

Period5

-1.9

-3.7

-1.6

-2.7

-2.1

-.8

-2.1

-.8

Period6

-5.6*

-2.8

-5.5*

-2.9

-5.4*

-1.9

-5.4*

-1.9

Period7

-4.2†

-1.8

-3.9

-2.0

-3.9

.0

-3.9†

-.4

Period8

0.0

-6.3

0.2

-6.4

0.3

-5.3

0.3

-4.8

Period9

-2.5

-6.6

-2.1

-6.5

-2.3

-4.4

-2.2

-4.1

13.8**

0.8

8.2*

8.8**

-3.9**

3.8

2.5

13.4**

GroupSize

2.4*

CommCapacity
CommCapacity x
GroupSize
∆R2 Profit

	
  

M2

12.3**

1.8

†

-3.0**

.061

.015

.024

.004
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Std. Error Profit 9.352
2

9.296

9.191

9.187

∆R Time

.052

.069

.036

.020

Std. Error Time

22.480

21.679

21.269

21.057

Unstandardized coefficients are displayed above. ** Regression significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Regression significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). † Regression significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).

Table 4: Multiple Linear Regression Coefficients

With respect to group task performance, in terms of task completion time, both the main
effects and the interaction effect are significant. Based on “Model 2”, the groups with the
communication channel spent 8.8 seconds longer than the groups without the communication
channel to generate the first agreed bidding price (p<0.01). The larger groups, i.e. groups with
four buyers, spent 13.8 seconds longer than the smaller groups, groups with two buyers, to
generate the first bid (p < 0.01). Thus, increasing the size of groups and introducing
communication delays group task completion in terms of generating an initial group bid.
Based on “Model 3”, groups with four buyers with a communication channel spent 13.4
seconds longer than groups in the other treatments to generate the first bid offer, i.e. the larger
the group the stronger the effect of communication. The R-square changes indicate that
communication channel, group size and the interaction effect contributed 6.9%, 3.6% and 2%
explanatory power, respectively.
Robustness Tests
Using linear regression, the effects of each predictor can be predicted through the
significance level of the coefficients. But employing a mixed model analysis has been
recommended as the better alternative in cases with missing observations in repeated measures
than the conventional regression method (Zwass, 2010; McCulloch and Searle, 2001). To check
the robustness of the main tests, a mixed model analysis on the two dependent variables was
conducted. In the new model, the group was set as the test subject instead of experimental round
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of a group, and, likewise, the period was set as the within subject effects instead of as control
variables. The type III tests of fix effects for the two dependent variables are shown in table 5
and table 6, which suggest that CommCapacity is a significant predictor for Profit, and
CommCapacity, GroupSize, and the interaction CommCapacity×GroupSize is a significant
predictor of Time. These results are highly consistent with the results of the main tests, except for
the effect of group size on buyer profit. The robustness analysis could not identify a significant
effect of group size on buyer profit, however, but this inconsistency could perhaps be attributed
to the unequal sample size of testing groups. The hypothesis testing results are summarized
below table 7.

Source

Numerator
df

Denominator
df

F

Sig.

Intercept

1

258.6

5722.1

0.000

Group Size

1

258.6

2.1

0.149

CommCapacity
CommCapacity
× GroupSize

1

258.6

4.7

0.031

1

258.6

1.0

0.328

Table 5: Robustness Test on Profit
Denominator
df
212.52

F

Sig.

Intercept

Numerator
df
1

461.2

0.000

Group Size

1

212.52

37.9

0.000

CommCapacity
CommCapacity
× GroupSize

1

212.52

22.9

0.000

1

212.52

11.2

0.001

Source

Table 6: Robustness Test on Time for Task Completion
No.

H1
H2
H3

	
  

Hypothesis
Buyer Profit
Hypothesis 1 (Group-Size—Buyer-Surplus
Hypothesis):Increasing the group size of buyers in a group-buyer
model will tend to increase buyer profits.
Hypothesis 2 (Communication -Capacity—Buyer-Surplus
Hypothesis): Introducing a communication channel for buyers to
exchange private messages will tend to increase buyer surplus.
Hypothesis 3 (Communication-Capacity & Group-Size

DV

Result

Buyer Profit

Not
Supported

Buyer Profit

Not
Supported

Buyer Profit

Not
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H4

H5

H6

Interactions on Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Introducing
communication channel in group-buying will increase buyer profit
in big groups more greatly than in small group.
Time for Group Task Completion
Hypothesis 4 (Group-Size—Task-Completion Hypothesis):
Increasing the group size of buyers will tend to delay group task
performance.
Hypothesis 5 (Communication-Capacity—Task-Completion
Hypothesis): Introducing a communication channel for buyers to
exchange private messages will tend to delay group task
performance.
Hypothesis 6 (Communication & Group-Size Interactions on
Task-Completion Hypothesis): Introducing communication
channel in group-buying will delay the group task performance in
big groups more than in small groups.

Supported

Task
Completion
Time

Supported

Task
Completion
Time

Supported

Task
Completion
Time

Supported

Table 7: Summary of Hypothesis Testing
Additional Analysis
Based on the results, the effect of adding a communication channel on buyer surplus
occurs in the opposite direction than theoretically predicted. Because of the dynamic and highly
interactive nature of the group-buying process, it is difficult to discern the reasons for the
negative effect of the communication channel. Therefore, a post-hoc analysis was conducted to
explore some possible explanations for this unexpected but interesting finding.
In tables 8 and 9, which summarize the descriptive statistics on bidding and
communication activities —number of bids submitted and number of messages posted, the
analysis shows that bigger groups submitted more bids and exchanged more messages than
smaller groups, implying that bigger groups have to process more information within the same
time window in the process of reaching consensus on a joint offer than smaller groups. Thus a
logistic regression for GroupSize and CommCapacity on success rate was conducted, using (early
vs. late) rounds as a control variable, and found that bigger groups were less successful in
making deals, i.e. getting a bid accepted by the seller, than smaller groups (p < 0.01). The larger
group / smaller group odds ratio of 2.625 shows that a larger group is much more likely to fail in
the bidding task than a smaller group (p<0.01). While groups with communication channels
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showed a lower success rate than the groups without communication channels (table 8), this
difference was statistically not significant. However, all groups were generally more successful
in making deals in later rounds than in earlier ones (p < 0.01), confirming learning effects in
terms of deal-making success rates similar to those found for profit levels.
The number of bids submitted per group depends not just on group coordination but also
on mutual interdependencies between buyer and seller bidding tactics, e.g. forceful seller
negotiation or buyer efficiency in response to rejection. The average number of bids submitted
per buyer almost doubles in failed rounds compared to successful rounds (table 8). In the rounds
that ended successfully with accepted bids, groups with a communication channel submitted
fewer bids than the groups without the communication channel, which implies that with
increased communication, buyers tend to submit their bids more tactically, than buyers without a
communication channel. This leads to the notion that the availability of a communication
channel helped groups with coordination, resulting in more efficient bidding and fewer
exploratory bids. However, increased profits were not observed as expected from improved
group coordination patterns.
Without Communication

Small
Groups
Large
Groups

With Communication

Successful
Rounds

Success
Rate

Failed Rounds
n

# of bids

n

# of Bids

77.3%

25

12.4

85

57.7%

55

14.4

75

Successful
Rounds

Success
Rate

Failed Rounds
n.

# of bids

n

# of bids

5.6

72.3%

36

6

94

2.6

6.1

52.5%

38

11.1

42

5.9

Table 8: Bids per Group
Failed Rounds

Successful Rounds

Small Group

1.3 (2.7)

0.9 (1.8)

Big Group

2.9 (11.6)

1.8 (7.2)

Table 9: Messages Posted per Buyer (Group)
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In terms of messages exchanged, buyers posted more messages in rounds that ended
unsuccessfully, i.e. rounds with failed last bids and no deal. Given the time constraints for a
round, if buyers were not able to use the communication channel effectively, for example, buyers
spent time posting irrelevant or redundant information, information overload could occur. The
literature in task complexity and decision-making suggests that for performing more complex
decision tasks, decision-makers tend to simplify the process by limiting information search to
accelerate their evaluation (Parameswaran and Whinston, 2007). Ineffective communication
burdens the decision making process for the buyers, which results in information overload and
failed bidding outcomes. This applies especially to the larger groups which not only generate
more messages per group member, but also necessitates the need to read and process messages
from a larger number of group members. In other words, the amount of information shared
grows with group size.
The analysis of buyer activity suggests that introducing a communication channel can
help group buyers coordinate better bidding tactics, but also that if buyers use the
communication channel inappropriately information overload might occur. Given the ambiguity
between improved bidding tactics but unchanged buyer profits, increasing communication
capacity will not by itself improve buyer profit in a group-buying auction setting. This outcome
is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis that publicly posted price signals (bids) contain
all the information needed to discover efficient transaction prices in transparent markets
(Granados, et al. 2006; Smith, 2003).
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion
This research is consistent with the principles of design science —designing an IT artifact
(e.g., an IT-enabled market mechanism for electronic group-buying platforms), implementing it,
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and then evaluating it (using economic performance measures). Combining design science
(Hevner, et al. 2004) with experimental economics (Smith, 1989), as demonstrated with this
particular study, offers a useful approach to systematically design and evaluate new electronic
market mechanisms and technology features that is applicable for a large range of research
problems. Using market experiments in the laboratory presents a powerful method to evaluate
new market designs before deploying them in the real economy. This approach is particularly
appropriate in electronic commerce research that studies the economic value from incorporating
IT-enabled features and mechanisms in electronic market designs or deploying them on
electronic business platforms.
Implications
The findings have implications for both research and business practice. First, addressing
the gap in the original countervailing power theory (Galbraith, 1952) the findings suggest that
countervailing power theory not only applies to commercial buyers in business-to-business
commerce but also extends to consumer buyers who coordinate on electronic grouping
platforms. Second, the findings make a contribution to the literature on IT-enabled coordination
by showing that introducing a consumer-to-consumer communication tool can create an effective
coordination mechanism with significant consumer value that can change the social commerce
relations between sellers and buyers.
For business practice, the study suggests that group-buying site operators need to be
concerned about both the level and the kind of communication tools they want to offer to their
buyer customers and they need to be mindful that larger buyer groups may need different kinds
of communication support than smaller groups.
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Possible Future Research Directions
This paper investigated the role of communication technology in group-buying from a
decision-making theoretical perspective, emphasizing task-technology fit and advocating a
positivist research approach (Jarvenpaa , 1989). In order to more accurately capture the
dynamics among buyer groups, such as leadership, conflict management or atmosphere, an
interpretive research method such as qualitative interviews or protocol analysis should be applied
in future research to better understand the decision making process from the buyer’s point of
view (DeSanctis, and Poole, 1994). In addition, the interdependent role of task complexity,
conflicts, and group diversity (Jehn, et al. 1999) should be investigated more deeply in order to
develop more efficient market mechanism and provide more personalized technology platform
designs.
Another research possibility is to drop the design assumption of fixed, pre-assigned
groups and let buyers decide if and when to join a group, thereby introducing some level of
competition between buyers. More specific seller analysis should be done as well and might
include a seller design with more complex seller cost structure with explicit reservation prices.
Further research concerning the evaluation of other possibly more sophisticated social
technology tools that could be used in online group-buying.
Finally, this study is limited to a group-buying model with an adaptive price threshold,
but it suggested that different types of price thresholds, including fixed and adaptive ones, are
examined in future research.
Limitations
This study has a number of limitations. While the experimental design was tested in early
pilot tests and subsequently refined and improved several times, a number of potential design
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limitations became only apparent after data collection had been under way or completed. The
following seven appear to be the most critical ones.
1. The number of rounds in which groups failed to successfully form and transact
was higher than expected, possibly related to restrictive time restrictions (two and
a half minutes per round).
2. The bidding mechanism implemented (incremental bid changes only) may have
complicated price negotiation among buyers in cases where the valuation spreads
were high.
3. Buyers were pre-assigned to groups and did not have a choice to form alternative
groups if the existing one did not match their preference structure well.
4. Participants were compensated with course credit, which may not have been
sufficient to fully induce economic behavior in every case.
5. The experiment only implemented one specific type of (buyer-initiated) groupbuying model, which limits generalization beyond this particular model.
6. It is unclear how robust our results are with respect to changes in the pre-assigned
buyer preferences (i.e., the set of WTP values).
7. Since there were no associated time costs in the experiment, buyers were not
given extrinsic rewards for quicker deal completion times.

Concluding Remarks
The study finds partial support for Galbraith’s original skepticism regarding the potential
for countervailing power from consumers (Galbraith, 1952). While adding a communication
channel improved the groups’ ability to form it did not prove sufficient to help them negotiate
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better prices. In other words, the communication channel provided groups the necessary capacity
to accomplish the coordination task of group formation but was insufficient to successfully
accomplish the more complex task of price negotiation. As a possible explanation of this finding
it is suggested that a simple messaging box may be sufficient to support the former, but not the
latter task, and that more advanced communication tools, such as social media tools with better
information filtering features, may be necessary to provide consumers with a communication
channel for more effective negotiation and coordination.
Simple message exchange appeared too unstructured and distracting to efficiently aid
price finding in our experiments, within the given time restrictions placed on participants.
Smaller groups were the most effective with using communication technology, but groups
became bogged down with information overload as group size increased and more messages
were posted and needed processing. Larger groups with the communication channel actually
performed worse and were ineffective in using communication technology to better support
coordination; their performance slowed and only obtained marginally better prices. The
complexity from larger groups offset any advantages that adding communication capacity could
enable.
This interesting tradeoff between the benefits from IT-enabled coordination capabilities
and its associated costs due to increase task complexity raises the question of how to best
manage consumer interactions on social buying platforms.
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3. Examining the Effects of Competition on IT Enabled Market Coordination
– Study 2
3.1 Introduction
This research presents an evaluation of a specific electronic market design based on the
principles of design science —designing an IT artifact (e.g., an IT-enabled market mechanism
for electronic group-buying platforms), implementing it, and then evaluating it (using economic
performance measures). Combining design science (Hevner et al. , 2004) with experimental
economics (Smith, 1989), offers a useful approach to systematically design and evaluate new
electronic market mechanisms and technology features that is applicable for a large range of
research problems. Using market experiments in the laboratory presents a powerful method to
evaluate new market designs before deploying them in the real economy. As an example, the this
study will explore the impact of competition and social facilitation under time pressure on group
buying performance in terms of buyer profits and task completion and time to completion.
Experiments conducted in the laboratory using a variation of the buyer-initiated intra-auction
group-buying model (Chen et al., 2009). The basic experimental environment was the same as
the one used in the first study.
Social buying platforms support social facilitation and social presence with features that
help buyers form groups and coordinate group tasks (negotiating a joint group offer with an
agreed upon price and submitting it to the seller). Group buying differs from individual buying in
standard business-to-consumer electronic commerce in two important ways. First, buyers
organize into groups in order to aggregate demand and leverage increased bargaining power to
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obtain price discounts from the seller. Second, group-buying sites could offer features that
facilitate social interactions among buyers. Using an electronic group buying setting is
interesting for two theoretical reasons. First, buyers act collectively, interacting and coordinating
with others in order to create a joint offer, called a bid, to a seller. This raises bid
interdependency in both private and common value auctions. Second, social buying platforms
offer a variety of technical artifacts supporting social facilitation among buyers at different
levels, which can vary the impact on group coordination and performance. Generally, the auction
literature has found that competition leads to overbidding and profit loss and that social
facilitation can increase competitive motivation.
The IT artifact poses a challenge for platform sponsors, who control the platform design.
These designers must be aware that increased levels of social facilitation (and communication
support for the buyers) may increase the risk of buyer collusion to sellers, causing sellers to
defect and cease selling on the platform.
The creation of a group buying experiment enabling the presence of competitive arousal
for decision-making under time pressure is based on prior research (Ku et al., 2005). However,
this study seeks to extend Ku’s model in two distinct ways. First, this study extends the decisionmaking problem from an individual to a group setting and, secondly, it introduces an online
communication channel representing an artifact that introduces social facilitation. It is expected
that the results should be similar to prior literature with respect to the introduction of
competition, i.e. rivalry among buyers will have a negative effect on surplus and task time
completion. In addition, it is expected that the effects of social facilitation on task completion
and time to completion should also be consistent with prior literature. .
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This study should contribute to the auction and social commerce literature showing that
buyers may develop bidding behaviors, which violate predictions of rational choice theory, and
thus buyers may obtain some benefits from competition when buyers act as a group with
communication capabilities. Introducing competition allows for the study of decision-making
under pressure of online consumers (using a particular setting; an electronic group buying
platform in this case).
3.2 Theoretical Perspectives and Hypothesis Development
The theoretical foundation for this study is rooted in three areas of research, psychology,
economics and information technology. The economics literature is used to theorize the
relationship between buyer group size and surplus generated in the market. Second, decision
making theory in psychology and in information systems, is utilized to theorize the effects of
competition and social facilitation on group performance in terms of buyer profits, task
completion, and time to completion.
Research on competitive interaction has shown that time pressure is a critical driver
heightened state of arousal or stress, known drive theory (Zajonc, 1965), as it increases the need
to make quick decisions and decreases the consideration of the consequences (Porter, 1980;
Scherer and Ross, 1990). Time pressures therefore are a critical component of the hypothesis
development, as a necessary condition for inducing this heightened state.
Task completion
The study of competition and task completion has its origins in social psychology when
Triplet (1898) examined the effect on individual’s performance under competition. In
economics, Erev et al. (1993) found that orange pickers gathered more oranges when the reward
structure was based on the performance of other pickers. While some researchers have found that
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competition can lead to anxiety and less motivation (Deutsch 1949; Deci at al., 1981), economics
has a long history of studying competition in markets and has generally concluded that
competition increases efficiency in market settings for limited and contested resources
(Hirshleifer, 1978) Thus:

Hypothesis 1: Increasing competition among buyers in a group-buyer model will tend to reduce
the failure rate for task completion.

Buyer profit
Generally, classic rational choice theory views competitive behavior as advantageous to
the market and individuals regarding the achievement of goals. Behavioral research, however,
has demonstrated a tendency for competitively motivated individuals to abandon rationally
determined (optimal) decision rules when emotional factors, such as competition, are present,
especially under time pressure when judgments and quick decisions are required, and when
outcomes are there exists a high level of interdependence. These types of behaviors can severely
impact the individual’s performance and outcome (Garcia et al., 2006; Guth et al., 1982). The
desire to win can overpower originally stated goals based on utility maximization and thus
individuals become more willing to exceed their desired maximum payment and ultimately take
profit losses in order to secure the completion of the given task and win (Cox et al., 1992;
Malhotra et al., 2008; Jones, 2011). Thus, it is posited that:

Hypothesis 2: Increasing competition among buyers will tend to reduce buyer profits.

	
  

	
   48	
  

As stated above, research has demonstrated that under competition, the performance of
individuals should increase; however, the desire to win may impact individual’s rational
performance. Additionally, researchers in social psychology have identified that the level of
interdependence of the task may moderate the effects of competition; i.e. competition tends to be
detrimental for performance on more interdependent tasks (Miller & Hamblin, 1963; Stanne et
al. 1999). Recent research in social commerce suggests that social embeddedness of market
transactions like social interactions with other online communication features can mitigate the
effects of competitive pressure (Malhotra, 2010; Takac et al., 2011).

Hypothesis 3: Increasing competition among buyers will more strongly reduce buyer profits in
larger groups.
Hypothesis 4: Increasing competition among buyers will less strongly reduce buyer profits in the
presence of a communication channel.

In the first study it is posited that group communication is most effective in smaller
groups. In large groups cognitive demands on information processing can offset the benefits of
having access to more information. Larger groups are required to process the information and
make decisions thereby increasing their time to form groups, and thereby reducing their
effectiveness. Hence the following is proposed.

Hypothesis 5: Providing access to a communication channel where buyers can exchange private
messages will increase profits in smaller groups.
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Time to task completion
Researchers have also suggested that under competitive arousal individuals will shift
from focusing on original goals (e.g. profit maximization) to others like winning an auction and
getting what they wanted in the first place. Such a reversal of preferences can lead to a more
aggressive pursuit of secondary goals (Bazerman et al., 1992). As Tripplet (1898) found in his
study, the competitive stimulus can have a “powerful and lasting” effect on the performance of
individuals. Hence:

Hypothesis 6: Increasing competition among buyers speed up the time to task completion.

However, the first study posits that offering communication capabilities will tend to
distract users as they exchange off-topic messages, which can decrease the time to completing
the set task. Preliminary results indicate that group size negatively affects group coordination due
to coordination problems and the complexity of group formation. Thus, the following two
hypotheses are predicted.

Hypothesis 7: Providing a communication channel among buyers will slow down the time to task
completion.
Hypothesis 8: Proving a communication channel among buyers of larger groups will have
slower time to task completion than smaller groups.

From the original design of Triplett (1898), which focused on the impact of competition
on performance, many psychologists have studied the effect of social facilitation. Throughout the
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20th century researchers have studied the effect of social facilitation and competition and some
inconsistent results. The effect of social facilitation has been grouped into three categories 1)
drive theories, 2) social comparison theories, and 3) cognitive process theories (Aiello and
Douthitt, 2001). Zajonc (1966) prescribes that increases in arousal will enhance simple
performance tasks and that even the “mere” presence of others is sufficient (Zajonc, 1980).
Social facilitation may also be present when individuals are concerned about how they compare
to others (Cotrell, 1972). From a cognitive process standpoint, distraction-conflict may also serve
as a driver to facilitate performance of simple tasks (Aiello and Douthitt, 2011; Baron 1986).
Baron (1986) suggests that there three conditions to trigger the effect, 1) the distraction is
interesting, or hard to ignore, such as communication between the buyers, 2) there is a time
pressure to complete the task, and 3) attending to the task and distraction simultaneously
becomes increasingly difficult.
Larger group sizes therefore increase the amount of social facilitation, which can
therefore heighten the effects of competitive arousal, increase dominant responses and enhance
performance on salient tasks (Ku et al., 2005; Zajonc, 1966). Larger groups therefore can thus
exhibit this effect at stronger levels than smaller groups (Guerin, 1986). Hence, the following is
posited:

Hypothesis 9: The presence of competition in large buyer groups will result in faster completion
times than those of smaller groups.

Increasing communication capacity should enable buyers to share more information and
thus coordinate better with the member of their buyer group in comparison to groups without the
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added communication mechanism (Dennis et al., 2008). Enhanced communication should prove
to make it easier for groups to form and complete their tasks. When individuals are competitively
motivated and rely on others for achieving the desired outcome, more information and increased
communication should result in more efficient group formation (Lustgarten, 1975). Thus,
relationships are expected to form more readily in the presence of additional communication.

Hypothesis 10: The presence of competition will result in faster completion times in the presence
of a communication channel.

Finally, Chen et al. (2009) has shown that technology provides effective communication
in intra-auction bidding clubs but coordination becomes more difficult as the member base
increases. Hence, the following:

Hypothesis 11: In the presence of a communication channel, larger groups will have slower time
to task completion than smaller groups.

Effects of Communication
Communication represents a unique perspective in the study of small groups. Lowry et al.
(2006), specifically examined the impact of group size on communication. The study filled the
gap in literature to measure specifically group sizes of 3 and 6, to determine the effect on the
quality of the communication as measured by 5 constructs of quality, openness, richness,
appropriateness, accuracy as defined by Burgoon, Bonito, et al. (2002). The study found that
smaller groups using computer mediated communication (CMC), resulted in higher quality
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communication with respect to appropriateness, openness, and accuracy, which matched results
from a similar study of Face-to-Face groups conducted by Burgoon, Bonito, et al. (2002).
Relevant research provides some possible explanations. Larger groups tend to lead to
fewer ideas and increased conflict among the group (Valachich et al. 1995; Gallupe et al, 1992).
Larger groups suffer from more complexity and potential distractions thereby minimizing the
quality of their communication resulting in process losses from social loafing (Chidambaram and
Tung, 2005), evaluation apprehension and production blocking (Aiken et al., 1994; Nunamaker
et al., 1991)
The increased complexity of larger groups and increased communication therefore is
believed to increase the conflict, thus leading to lower buyer surplus and increased task to time
completion. Therefore the following hypotheses are developed.

Hypothesis 12: Larger groups will have a larger number of communications per buyer than
smaller groups.
Hypothesis 13: Larger communications per buyer will negatively affect time-to-task-completion.
Hypothesis 14: Larger communications per buyer will negatively affect buyer surplus

3.3 Methodology
Experimental design
An economic experiment created an electronic market in the laboratory where
participants were asked to coordinate group purchases of a single product from a monopolistic
seller. Each individual buyer has a private, pre-assigned value for the same single product.
Consumer valuations vary across buyers and each buyer needs to buy one unit of the product.
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The participants were recruited from an undergraduate student subject pool and were
compensated with course credit. However, a number of important modifications and additions
are implemented to the basic design as described next.
Using a 2×2×2 factorial design in which three variables at two levels are manipulated
competition and two factors of social facilitation (group size and communication capabilities).
Time pressure is induced by limiting the auctions to two-and-a-half minutes each held constant
in all treatments. This time limit was determined after a number of pilot runs that have already
been conducted. This time window was sufficient for groups to complete given tasks but short
enough to make them feel that they needed to make decision quickly.
In the experiment, competition (C) is induced through the creation of rival groups. In one
treatment (C=low) only one group was present to negotiate bids with the seller. In another
(C=high) two rival groups were created. Participants are brought in and set at stations randomly,
and each group of stations forms a group. Buyers can either place an opening bid (proposed
purchasing price offered to the seller) or join an existing bid within the group. Under the
competition mechanism, for each group, only the buyers who are willing and quick enough to
join a common offer with an agreed bid price have the chance to become the actual buyers (if the
bid is successful). For the groups without the competition mechanism, all buyers are in the same
group, and therefore, there is no competition from a rival group.
Social facilitation is represented by two variables, group size (GS) and level of
communication (CC). First, the smaller group sizes, 2 buyers, with the presence of a larger group
sizes, 4 buyers will be compared. Our operationalization of large and small groups is similar to
those in prior research (Engle-Warnick and Ruffle, 2005).
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The third manipulation compared low with high communication capacity among buyers.
At the high level (CC=high) a communication channel was included as a feature on the buyer
screen while no such communication channel was offered at the low level. The communication
channel will be operationalized with a communication box, similar to an Internet chat box, where
buyers could post and receive private messages from their fellow group members.
Procedure
Each session consisted of groups with 1 seller (monopolist) and either 2, 4 or 8 potential
buyers. Upon entering the lab, the participants were randomly assigned to computer terminals
with a seller screen for the seller and a buyer screen for the buyers. Once the participants were
seated, they are asked to review a set of instructions (see Appendix C) that provide information
about the group buying mechanism and their respective roles and tasks. Each session consists of
one practice period and 10 additional periods, where buyers worked to coordinate group offers to
make bids to the seller. Each round lasted 150 seconds.
The buyer and seller tasks are similar across all eight treatments with some important
differences. In the treatments with communication channel buyers could use a chat box to
exchange private messages, which was not available in treatments without the communication
channel. The manipulation of the number of buyers changes the number of other buyers required
for a group, but does not affect the interface of the buyer screens or their principle tasks. In
treatments without competition, participants are assigned to a group before the round (static
groups). In treatments with competition, rival groups are set up and buyers could join and switch
groups depending on currently posted bids (dynamic groups).
Buyers can increase their joint offer or join a different offer if their bid is not accepted.
The buyer screen is more complex, as illustrated in the two sample buyer screens in Appendix D.
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First, it shows the buyers the assigned valuation of the product. Each buyer has a unique, private
product valuation that is randomly selected from a uniform distribution (25,100). To reduce the
potential for learning effects, the product valuation values are rotated every period. Except for
the initial bid, which can be placed by any buyer, bids could only be changed in single
increments, i.e. represented as one-dollar increments. Once bids are placed, the other buyers can
"join" the bid if the bid price is below their product value, thus preventing overbidding. Once the
requisite number of buyers (2 or 4) joined, group formation occurs the bid would be submitted to
the seller (task completion).
In the treatments with competition, buyers can join any bid, allowing for dynamically
forming groups, i.e., a buyer can choose a bid for 20, but then decide to join another offer at 19,
which can be created by a different group of participants. By allowing buyers to join different
offers, competition between individual buyers is created. The interface only tells the buyer the
number of buyers in the group but it doesn't indicate who the other buyers are, therefore, there is
no identification of buyers. In the treatment with a private communication channel buyers were
able to exchange messages via an instant message type of communication box, although the
communication channel indicates the buyer number, individual buyers can not be identified.
The tasks and interface for the seller remained unchanged across treatments. The seller
receives bids once a group formed and made a joint offer. The seller’s screen shows the bid
price, the number of people who joined in the bid and the cumulative amount of the offer (see
Appendix D for an illustrative seller screen shot). The seller then has the opportunity to accept
the bid, which terminates the current session, or takes no action and leave the bid active, thus
allowing time for other bids to form. Sellers only see the highest bid that meets the requisite
number of buyers; therefore, only one bid at a time is visible to the sellers at any given time.
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When a transaction occurs, i.e. a seller accepts an offer from the buyer group, both the
seller’s profit and buyer’s profit is calculated and shown to the participants. Buyer profits (i.e.,
buyer surplus) are computed for each buyer as transaction price less product valuation. No
profits accrue when a round ends with no bids being accepted. The cumulative profit over all ten
periods is used to compare how each buyer performed in the experiment.
Experimental variables
Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

Control Variables

Competition (C = low or high);
Communication level (CC = yes or no)
Group size (GS = 2 or 4)
Buyer profit
Task completion (accepted bid)
Time to completion
Message count per buyer
Message length per buyer
Time pressure (auction length = 150 secs)
Experimental periods (P1, P2, …, P10 = 0 or 1)

Table 10. Experimental variables
3.4 Data analysis
Descriptive analysis
The experiment was carried out with a total of 76 groups. Groups were comprised of one
seller and two, four or eight potential buyers. Data was collected from each group over 10 rounds
of the collective bidding, representing a typical 2x2x2 factorial design with repeated measures.
Out of the 760 rounds over the 76 groups, task completion occurred with 564 bids from 76
groups, that is, those bids that were successful and accepted by a seller. The remaining 196
rounds did not generate a sales transaction groups for two reasons. Either the buyers could not
agree on common bid to form a group offer (group coordination failure) or the submitted bids
were too low and rejected by the seller (price setting failure). Table 11 shows the number of
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successful bids and the groups that generated them broken down by experimental treatments. A
total of eight treatments are examined by the manipulation of three variables competition (C),
groupsize (GS), and presence of communication channel (CC) at two levels.

Competition

No

Yes

Communication Channel

Group
Size
2

No

Yes

85 (11)

94 (13)

4

69 (12)

42 (8)

2

69 (8)

68 (8)

4

70 (8)

70 (8)

Table 11: Bids per Manipulation (Groups)
Hypothesis testing
Main Test 1
The study uses a logistic regression to examine H1. Specifically, when rival groups are
created, competition is present, and thus the failure rate was expected to decrease. When rival
groups were created, increasing competitive arousal, the failure rate (p) for completing the task
successfully making a group purchase in an experimental round significantly decreased from
0.332 when competitive arousal was low to 0.134 when it was high. The odds ratio of
competition arousal (0 /1.0) is 0.312.
Odds ratio=[ p0/(1- p0)]/[ p1/(1- p1)]

A logistic regression test shows the effect of injecting competition on the failure rate. The
impact of providing competition arousal can significantly reduce failure rate for completing the
task (Table 3) as shown in table 12. The chi-squared test statistic of 36.3, with 2 degrees of
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freedom (p<.01)indicates that the overall effect of competition is statistically significant thus
supporting H1.
β
Intercept
Competition(C)

S.E

Wald

df

Sig

-.701
.1019
176.3
1
.000***
-1.163 .1930
36.3
1
.000***
Pseudo R-Squares
Cox & Snell R-Square: -0.055 (df=2)
Nagelkerke R-Square: -0.082 (df=2)

Odds
Ratio
.496
.312

Table 12: Logistic Regression

Main Test 2
Dummy coding was used to convert the categorical variables competition (C), group size
(GS) and communication (CC) into dichotomous variables. Specifically, for the treatment with
group size of 2, GS was coded as “2”, and for larger groups, group size of 4, GS=“4”. Similarly,
for the treatment without the availability of a communication channel CC was coded as “1”, and
with communication channel CC=“2”; and for the treatment without competition, C was coded
as “0”, and with competition, was coded as “1”. An additional 9 dummy variables (P1, P2, …,
P9) was implemented to represent the experimental periods 2 to 10, while “period” 1 serves as
the reference measure. Two separate regression tests were conducted to analyze the proposed
hypotheses on the two dependent variables “(buyer) profit” and on “time (for task completion)”
respectively.
The results of the two separate linear tests are combined in one table (Table 13), one test
for buyer profits, aggregated across buyers and rounds, and the other test on the time for task
completion. In order to examine the contribution of main effects and interaction effects, a
hierarchical multiple linear regression was performed in three stages, “Model 1”, “Model 2”, and
“Model 3”, in which the control variables, “period”, the main effects “competition mechanism”,
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“communication channel”, and “group size”, were added along with three two-way interaction
effects. The 9 dummy variables, P2 through P10 are included in the test in order to control the
effect of repeated measurement (round effects). The coefficients of P2 through P10 indicate the
differences in profit or time between a specific period and the reference period 1. By statistically
controlling for the effects of repeated measures, more valid results regarding the treatment
effects are obtained.
Buyer profit (H2 – H5)
Examining the regression models with respect to buyer profit, competition appears to be
the only significant main effect, additionally; only the interaction between competition and
communication appears to be significant. “Model 2” shows that the buyer profit of the groups
under competitive conditions results in 5.94 (p<.01, ΔR2=.043) lower buyer profit than groups
under non competitive conditions. Thus supporting H2 that competition will suppress buyer
profits thereby benefiting the seller.

Model 1

	
  

Model 2

Model 3

Profit

Time

Profit

Time

Profit

Time

Intercept

35.13**

67.07**

37.87**

52.86**

39.8***

52.60**

P2

8.07**

-5.92

8.3**

-6.36

8.32**

-5.78

P3

9.33**

.86

9.49**

.43

9.44**

.75

P4

3.90†

-.50

4.17†

-1.35

4.26†

-.91

P5

4.16†

-5.83

3.99†

-5.04

3.83†

-5.18

P6

10.44**

-16.46*

10.2**

-15.89*

10.42**

-15.82*

P7

12.94**

-15.20†

12.6**

-14.22†

12.79

-13.58†

P8

3.64

-13.43

3.4

-13.34†

3.41

-13.56†

P9

-.93

-7.97

-1.39

-6.81

-1.35

6.30

	
   60	
  

P10

1.21

1.3

-7.84

1.49

-7.90

C

-5.94**

16.54**

-10.39**

13.92*

CC

-.12

5.84†

-3.20*

1.89

GS

.68

7.24*

-.66

14.76*

C*CC

6.70**

14.83*

C*GS

2.88

-9.55

CC*GS

-.77

-6.85

F
2

Adj R
2

∆R -Profit

-6.82

8.626**

1.214

9.702**

3.565**

8.713**

3.350**

.108

.003

.155

.052

.169

.059

.108

2

∆R -Time

.043
.003

.014
.049

.007

Table 13: Multiple Linear Regression
Unstandardized coefficients are displayed above.
Model 1 to Model 3: Control Variables, Main Effects, and Interaction Effects
**. significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
†. significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).

Examining “Model 3” demonstrates the positive effect of the interaction term of
competition and communication (p<.01, ΔR2=.014),. The interaction effect of competition and
communication channel on group profit is represented in Figure 4. While introducing
competition reduced the buyer’s profit, the introduction of a communication channel between
buyers under competitive conditions appears to mitigate the profit supporting H4. No support for
the main effect of group size, or interaction effects, was found in the models, therefore H3 and
H5 were not supported.

	
  

	
   61	
  

Figure 4: Interaction Plot – Effect of Communication and Competition on Buyer Profit
Time to Task Completion (H6 – H11)
With respect to time for task completion, two main effects were significant at the p<.05
level, and one main effect was significant at p<.1 level. However, the results for H6 were
opposite of what were expected. In the presence of competition, it was expected that the time to
task completion would be faster; however, the results showed that time to completion actually
slowed. According to the results in Model 2, introducing competition actually increased the time
for task completion, completing a group purchase, by 16 seconds (p <.01). In addition, Providing
a communication channel to buyers increases the time for task completion by almost 6 seconds
(p<.1), while increasing the group size increases the time by about 7 seconds(p<.05).
Collectively, the main effects contribute 4.9% of predictive power.
The interaction effect of competition and communication (Figure 4) are positively
significant at the 0.05 level. The model showed that the time to task completion increased under
competition was mitigated by the presence of a communication channel by 14.8 seconds, as
opposed to the 16 seconds without the presence of communication (β=14.83, p<.05). This could
be that the complexity of the forming a group is aided with added communication. No other
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interaction effects were found to be significant. ”Model 3”, with these interaction effects has
5.9% of explanatory power. Thus, the results support H10, but no support for H9 or H11 were
found.
These results indicate that competition, under these conditions, appear to increase the
time for task completion and that offering communication channels enhances this effect (Figure
5). Additionally, a three way interaction between competition, groupsize and communication
channel was conducted and was found to be statistically significant; however due to the
complexity of three-way interactions, no additional insight is provided here, however it is
recommended that future studies potentially examine this effect.

Figure 5: Interaction Plot - Effect of Communication and Competition on Time to Completion
Effects of Communication (H12 – H14)
It was expected as per the literature that larger groups would have an increased number
of messages per buyer, since there would be more buyers to coordinate. In addition, it was
anticipated that these increased communications per buyer would increase coordination time,
thus affecting buyer surplus and time to completion; however, the models demonstrated that
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there were no statistically significant effects, either main or interaction (table 14). Thus H12,
H13 and H14 are not supported.

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Avg Msg Len

Avg Msgs / Buyer

Avg Msg Len Avg Msgs / Buyer Avg Msg Len

Intercept

18.047**

1.66

18.31**

1.52**

19.14

1.48**

P2

-1.48*

-.41

-1.49

.42

-1.69

.43

P3

-2.21

.47

-2.20

.50

-2.20

.50

P4

-1.62

.15

-1.56

.19

-1.80

.20

P5

-.75

-.04

-.83

-.04

-.77

-.04

P6

-2.18

.51

-2.28

.56

-2.15

.56

P7

-2.27

.42

-2.39

.45

-2.38

.45

P8

-3.03

.07

-3.05

.12

-3.04

.12

P9

-4.40

.50

-4.58

.51

-4.90

.53

P10

-1.05

.83

-1.19

.85

-1.06

.84

C

-.88

-.00

-2.77

.08

GS

.43

.24

-1.38

.33

3.80

-.18

C*GS
F
2

Adj R

Avg Msgs / Buyer

.219

.339

.202

.330

.28

.307

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

Table 14: Multiple Linear Regression (Messages)
Unstandardized coefficients are displayed above.
Model 1 to Model 3: Control Variables, Main Effects, and Interaction Effects
**. significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
†. significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).

In the absence of finding any statistically significant results with respect to the message
counts and average length per message, further examination of the messages uncovered a few
interesting results. Messages ranged in length from 1 to 90 characters in length, with an average
message length of 15.73 characters (σ=14.12). Then a plot was created to identify the message
length of each message at a given time during the simulation. Instead of using period as a
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categorical value (P1…P10), a number was created based on period and the time within the
period to reflect a point within the entire simulation. This was done by taking the number of
seconds remaining in the period and dividing by 150 to determine what part of the period the
message was created and then adding the period number to determine at what point in the
simulation was the message created. For example a message created in the 15th second of the 4th
period would be denoted as 4.10, and a message created at the 100th second of the fifth period
would be denoted as 5.66. The scatterplot shown in Figure 6 was created with a regression line,
which showed the effect of competition. Table 15 contains the linear model

Message Length
Overall
Without Competition
With Competition

μ

σ

15.73
15.19
16.58

14.12
13.95
14.34

β
Intercept
Time
Competition

S.E

t-value

Sig

19.98
-.49
1.929

.000**
.623
.053†

15.50
.78
-.06
.12
1.39
.72
F= 1.979 p=.139
R2=.001

Table 15: Effect of competition on message length over entire simulation
Unstandardized coefficients are displayed above.
**. significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
†. significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).

The regression lines drawn for the competitive factors demonstrates that competition may
increase the amount of communication that occurs between bidders and in conjunction with the
previous results, the increased communication, represented by longer message lengths, could be
a factor leading to the increased time to task completion and reduced buyer profit under
competition, but the effect is not significant from the regression analysis. It is therefore possible
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that these longer messages are creating noise and not adding value to the task being performed.
These results offer interesting avenues for future research.

Figure 6: Message Length Scatterplot With Regression Lines of Competitive Factor

Source

Denominator d.f.

F

Sig.

Intercept

551

623.1

.000

C

551

37.833

.000

CC

551

3.99

.046

GS
C * CC
C * GS
GS*CC

551
551
551
551

.177
10.916
2.042
.133

.674
.001
.154
.716

Table 16: Type III Tests of Fixed Effects on Buyer Profit

Source

Denominator d.f.

F

Sig.

Intercept

551

115.326

.000

C

551

5.376

.021

CC

551

.0530

.818

GS
C * CC

551
551

5.661
4.737

.017
.030
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C * GS
GS*CC

551
551

1.410
.959

.236
.328

Table 17: Type II tests of Fixed Effects on Time to Completion
Summary of Hypothesis Tests
Task Completion
H1

Increasing competition among buyers in a group-buyer model will tend to reduce the
sup
failure rate for task completion.
Buyer Profit – Main Effect

H2
H3
H4
H5

H6

Increasing competition among buyers will tend to reduce buyer profits.
Buyer Profit – Interaction Effects
Increasing competition among buyers will more strongly reduce buyer profits in
larger groups.
Increasing competition among buyers will less strongly reduce buyer profits in the
presence of a communication channel.
Providing access to a communication channel where buyers can exchange private
messages will increase profits in smaller groups.
Time to Task Completion –
Main Effects
Increasing competition among buyers speed up the time to task completion.
Reverse found to be significant with support at p<.01

sup
n.s.
sup
n.s

n.s.

H7

Providing a communication channel among buyers will slow down the time to task
completion.

n.s

H8

Proving a communication channel among buyers of larger groups will have slower
time to task completion than smaller groups

sup

Time to Task Completion –
Interaction Effects
H9
H10
H11

The presence of competition in large buyer groups will result in faster completion
times than those of smaller groups.
The presence of competition in larger buyer groups will result in faster completion
times than those of smaller groups in the presence of a communication channel.
In the presence of a communication channel, larger groups will have slower time to
task completion than smaller groups..
Effects of Communication

n.s.
sup.
n.s.

H12

Larger groups will have a larger number of communications per buyer than smaller
groups.

n.s.

H13
H14

Larger communications per buyer will negatively affect time-to-task-completion.
Larger communications per buyer will negatively affect buyer surplus

n.s.
n.s.

Table 18: Summary of Hypotheses
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Robustness Test
To check the robustness of the main tests, a mixed model analysis was conducted on the
two dependent variables, respectively. In the mixed model, group was set as the test subject
instead of bids, and the period was identified as the within subject effects instead of control
variables. In order to handle the unequal sample size issue, maximum likelihood estimation was
used. The test results for the two dependent variables, shown in table 16 and table 17, are
consistent with the results of the main test.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The study contributes a novel approach combining design science and experimental
economics for the purpose of designing and evaluating electronic market mechanism and
platform designs. The study applies the approach to an example case from electronic commerce,
using a bidding mechanism in an electronic group buying setting as a specific example. The
study also offers an elaboration on Ku et al.‘s (2005) competitive arousal model for decisionmaking (Galbraith, 1952) that introduces two novel features, the setting of a group-decision
making problem and the addition of communication level as an antecedent. The research adds to
the understanding of competitive behavior by considering the mitigating effects of offering
communication capabilities on decision outcomes. Finally, this study contributes to the emerging
social commerce literature by offering a novel, competition to help explain bidding outcomes in
electronic group buying.
The results provided demonstrate that competition plays a role in enhancing buyer profit
and increases the chances of winning a bid, as predicted by the literature. However, while
competition should enhance the performance of the participants, the results here show the
opposite. One reason for this could be the nature of competition. Competition from an individual
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perspective may be enhanced, however, because success in this case is dependent on groups, the
group formation , i.e. time to task completion, may lag. Additionally, the specific nature of
creating a group this context may be more complex than can be overcome by competitive forces.
Ultimately, more research in this area should be conducted, especially around the different types
of competition and more importantly a design that can specifically determine the difference
between single individual competition and competition around group formation.
The interaction effects, specifically, the role of communication on mitigation of task time
complexity is very interesting. An in depth analysis of how the communication mechanism was
used is warranted, and should be the subject of another study. It is not enough to just know that
the communication channel exists, it could be important to understand what messages they
communicate and what information is delivered to other buyers. As noted when an analysis of
the message length was performed, the message length dropped in the latter periods, which could
be indicative that the communication was becoming more “streamlined”, but this only occurred
in the non-competitive manipulation.
The study suffers from a few important limitations. First, the level of time pressure was
held constant across all treatments. Manipulating time pressure could yield additional insights on
the effects of competition. Second, the bids were only allowed to change in 1$ increments, which
could complicate negotiation among buyers and reduces the external validity somewhat.
Additionally, participants were compensated with course credit, which may not have been
sufficient to induce economic behavior in every case, and since the experiment only
implemented one specific type of (buyer-initiated) group-buying model, generalization is limited
beyond this particular model.
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Finally, the study has also some key practical implications for designers of group buying
platforms and operators of group buying sites. Providing a communication mechanism between
buyers as many social buying sites do may not impact buyer or seller profit, and therefore could
increase the complexity for buyers. Group size consideration must be determined carefully,
depending on the levels of competition and communication support as larger groups appear to be
adversely affected in terms of time and profit.
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4. Examining Bidder Network Structure of IT Enabled Markets– Study 3
4.1 Introduction
Consumer behavior and economically based research of online activities is fairly
abundant. Information systems research into electronic commerce over the past ten years has
examined how consumers behave online (Bellman, et al. 1999), how theories such as TAM and
flow theory are applied to online behavior (Koufaris, 2002), and how trust is perceived in online
firms (Battacherjee, 2002). Unfortunately, there has been very limited research conducted on the
nature of group buying and related activities, such as group buying. Group buying has become
prevalent with the emergence of sites such as Mercata and Groupon.
Economic models have sought to answer the question regarding unbalanced economic
power, to which group buying mechanism may be a response. Based on classical economic
literature, unbalanced economic power had two primary solutions, the power of competition and
regulation by the state (Rha and Widdows, 2002). However, in 1952, Galbraith presented an
alternative solution to problems of economic power, called the countervailing power theory,
which states that unbalanced economic power can be “held in check by the countervailing power
of those who are subject to it” (Galbraith, 1952). The theory explains the evolution of
countervailing power as a condition in which the existence of strong buyers would evolve as a
response to aggregation of power by sellers, and furthermore that this evolution would “occur
not in lockstep but as a response to the other” (Galbraith, 1952). It was posited by Galbraith that
consumers could not exercise countervailing power because of the significant coordination costs
and communication costs. If consumers could exercise countervailing power, it would manifest
itself through intermediaries such as wholesalers and retailers, who had more capability to
organize.
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This paper will focus on the group structure and characteristics in a competitive situation,
while simultaneously attempting to replicate findings from the previous two studies. Studying
the structure of the networks provides a strong method of analysis enabling the researcher to
understand the characteristics of ties between actors (Otte and Roussau, 2002). The previous
studies focused on the group performance and individual performance, with respect to buyer
profit and time to completion. This study seeks to add to the current findings by exploring the
nature of the ties formed by groups in an economic experiment and explores the effect of
manipulating the presence of communication channel on the network structure. Furthermore, by
developing the structural characteristics, the study aims to determine if these structures impact
buyer performance.
Replication is a critical component of experimental economics. Smith (1994) notes that
replication and control are the two primary means by which attempts are made to reduce the
error in our common knowledge of the economic processes. Recently the journal Research in
Experimental Economics dedicated an entire journal toward replicated studies (Volume 18)
citing in its’ call for papers, "that there appears to be a perception in the profession that
replication is often marginalized in favor of new statistically significant results." In following the
guidelines set for by Smith (1994), Experimental economists should perform replications and do
so, that results can be compared with replications of previous studies. Furthermore, these
replications are seldom, pure replications, i.e. with the exact same procedures, subject type, and
other procedures. More recently in October of 2014, a new journal from AIS called
“Transactions on Replication Research” has been founded, with the first article entitled “A
Replication Manifesto” (Dennis and Valachich, 2014). Journal AIS announced a journal
dedicated to replication in Information Systems. In this paper, they state the importance of
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replication for all social sciences and further encourage participation in replication research with
rigorous methodologies.
“We believe that replication is important to the future of information
systems research whether it is laboratory, survey, field, qualitative or
quantitative. Yet no current information systems journal seeks to publish
replications nor do we have a culture that encourages replication
research” (Dennis and Valacich, 2014)

Therefore, using the guidelines for experimental economics, this study will attempt to
replicate some of the findings from the first study with slight variations to either reinforce the
findings, or provide alternative reasons in the event of failure. From an information technology
perspective the interface is slightly altered to provide a richer interface, and from a control
perspective group size is standardized, but groups are allowed to form dynamically, while
manipulating the presence of a communication mechanism.
Thus by conducting a replication study, changing only a few parameters, the study will
report the findings and compare them to the previous studies. Secondly, the study will report the
structural characteristics such as degree, betweenness and closeness of the network structure
using Social Network Analysis, and determine the effect on buyer performance of these different
structures.
4.2 Theoretical Perspective and Hypothesis Development
Consumer behavior and economically based research of online activities is fairly
abundant. Information systems research into electronic commerce over the past ten years has
examined how consumers behave online (Bellman, et al. 1999), how theories such as TAM and
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flow theory are applied to online behavior (Koufaris, 2002), and examined trust in online firms
(Battacherjee, 2002). Other researchers have examined key economic principles are applied in
online auctions (Vragov, et al. 2010), piracy in digital music (Batacherjee, et al., 2003), and
online pricing behavior (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 1999). Unfortunately, there has been very
limited research conducted on the nature of collective or group buying and related activities. The
appeal to sellers of the collective buying model led to sites such as Mercata and Groupon, and its
rationale of driving prices lower through large quantity buying has been fairly obvious.
However, its lack of widespread acceptance isn’t so obvious and therefore, the potential of this
model hasn’t been realized either by academics or practitioners.
Countervailing Power Theory
Classical economic theory provides a robust analysis and framework for the regulation of
economic power. Unbalanced economic power had two primary solutions, the power of
competition and regulation by the state (Rha and Widdows, 2002). However, in 1952, Galbraith
presented an alternative solution to problems of economic power, called the countervailing
power theory.
Countervailing Power theory states that unbalanced economic power can be “held in
check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it” (Galbraith, 1952). The theory
explains the evolution of countervailing power as a condition in which the existence of strong
buyers would evolve as a response to aggregation of power by sellers, and furthermore that this
evolution would “occur not in lockstep but as a response to the other” (Galbraith, 1952).
Shortly after its emergence, countervailing power came under immediate criticism. The
major counterargument was that competition and not some form of ‘countervailing power’ is the
driving force behind controlling economic power (Miller, 1957). Its validity continued to be
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questioned decades later (Von Ungern-Sternberg, 1996). Galbraith himself recognized some
limitations to the theoretical application believing that it might be unreasonable for consumers to
exercise countervailing power even though it was conceivably possible. (Galbraith, 1952; Rha
and Widdows 2002). Galbraith (1952) posited consumers’ exercise of countervailing power
would only manifest itself through intermediaries such as wholesalers and retailers, who had
more capability to organize.
Proponents of the theory have met with some successes. Since the theory was posited,
researchers seeking to validate this phenomenon have found that the more concentrated the
buyers were, the lower sellers price cost margins were (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Researchers
also have conducted experiments in countervailing power whereby the supply and demand
curves for products were common knowledge (Davis and Wilson, 2006), and a small number of
buyers influencing monopolist pricing (Engle-Warnick and Wilson, 2006). The last reference
focused on two buyer and four buyer groups, and found that two buyer groups attained a lower
price than their counterparts. While the authors identified possible different reasons for this, this
study will focus on the differences of the group composition.
Many economists have shown that consumers benefit when retailers exercise
countervailing power (Schumaker, 1991; Lustgraten, 1975), primarily because consumers are
engaged through intermediaries. However, the elimination of intermediaries is more easily
facilitated in electronic markets since participants can interact more freely (Malone, et al. 1987).
Disintermediation represents a critical aspect of the electronic commerce and has been
researched extensively over the past decade. Disintermediation occurs primarily due to the
reduced costs of transactions in electronic markets (Lee and Clark, 1996). Thus, it could be
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inferred that consumers, who can deal directly with sellers, have more incentive and the therefore
the facility, through electronic means, to exercise countervailing power.
Rha and Widdows (2002) provided a synopsis of how consumers could exercise
countervailing power on the Internet. In researching instances of group buying, they found that
consumers in the early 1990’s organized to drive down prices of heating fuel in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania through the formation of the Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) for Fuel
Buying. If consumers could achieve a critical mass, they could achieve significantly lower prices
through the negotiation of volume discounts directly from manufacturers (Rha and Widdows,
2002). However, it wasn’t without some problems. Critical mass was not easily attained, and the
product, heating fuel, was a commodity, which brought into question of how broadly the concept
of countervailing power, theoretical or practical, could be applied. It is argued in their paper that
in order to be successful, consumers would need to be better organized and would require more
simplified communication among buyers.
Collective Buying
Organization and communication among buyers are the key critical components to group
buying. Researching the factors leading to the organization of buyers, the process by which
pricing is determined, and the decision-making process to join an offer with other buyers is
critical to understanding how buyers can exercise countervailing power. Traditional group
buying sites (e.g. Mercata) offered reduced prices to buyers at various levels of volume, if
enough buyers joined the offer at those levels. Since much of the research into group buying
occurred in the early 2000’s comparing sites like Mercata, the research is limited to these types
of transaction where the sellers offer the price and controlled the buying levels (Kaufman and
Wang, 2001).
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This research focuses on the process by which buyers initiate the purchase decision,
meaning the offering of the price and the volume levels, through direct demand. In the former
case, the act of sellers providing different pricing levels gives the seller more power and as the
seller works to entice consumers to join in the purchase. It is argued that countervailing power
may not be at work here, primarily because there is no real organization of buyers, the
organization activity is passive in nature, almost as if a byproduct of the purchase process.
In order to be classified as countervailing power, via Galbraith definition, buyers must
organize and present offers, which can then be negotiated between the seller and the group. In
order to differentiate between the two, a new definition is proposed. For operational purposes
this mechanism of buyers aggregating together and collaborating to offer a price for acceptance
by a seller is classified as, collective, or collaborative, buying. The reason for this distinction is
to clearly delineate the activities in a collective buying arrangement whereby the buyers must
work together to form a group and commit to the purchase. This is fundamentally different than
the definition of group buying which focuses only on the pooling of the purchase volume to get a
lower price (Kaufmann and Wang, 2001).
Collective buying research in this case must therefore include as part of its research,
group dynamics including how individuals join or create groups, group formation, the decision
process within the group and the effectiveness of the group. Therefore, for completeness,
additional theoretical insight must be borrowed from virtual team literature
Virtual Group Formation
Collective buying represents an interesting area of research for group formation. Work
done in this area has provided the field with critical insights into topics such as contributions to
electronic repositories (Khanlanalli et al. 2005), trust in virtual teams (Piccoli and Ives, 2004)
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and leadership and performance in virtual teams (Wakefield et al., 2008). However, collective
buying could provide more insight into virtual team formation and decision-making because of
the relative simplicity in comparison with other virtual team research. While this simplicity could
easily be a source of contention for classification of a virtual team, the next section will attempt
to justify the terms use.
O’Leary and Cummings (2007) provide a strong review of the loose definitions of virtual
teams and focus on the terms virtual and geographically dispersed. Additionally they find that
geographical dispersion has three critical dimensions, spatial, temporal and, configurational. A
virtual team is identified as a group of dispersed workers brought together by information and
telecommunication technologies to accomplish at least one task (Powell, et al. 2004). Therefore,
while there is no doubt about the importance of telecommunication technology in collective
buying, there could be significant debate about whether the task itself is group related and
subsequently robust enough to constitute a virtual team. The task in collective buying could be
defined as the offering of a price to seller by a group of buyers who must agree on the offer. This
agreement constitutes a critical part of the task as a ‘group’. Even though this might lead to an
iterative process (i.e. seller rejects offers and buyers renegotiate), it is the key defining task for
the group. Thus the requirement could be considered met, at least on the surface, for the
consideration of these collective buying groups as virtual teams.
McGrath (1991) provides a framework for small groups by identifying three functions
and four modes. From a purely economic point of view, the primary function of the collective
buying group could be considered “production” as a means to maximize the utility of each
participant. McGrath’s other functions are “well-being” and “member-support”, which are not
believed to be as significant in collective buying. If one assumes from economic rationality that
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members of the group will only seek to maximize their utility. However, additional research
might uncover more information about these functions since collective buying has a social
component (Rha and Widdows, 2002).
McGrath (1991) also notes that groups will exist in one of four modes Inception,
Problem-Solving, Conflict Resolution and Execution; however, due to the simplistic nature of
the task in collective buying, it is believed that these groups will never be in a problem-solving
mode as defined by McGrath. In addition, as groups evolve over time they will start at the
inception stage identifying potential members, and proceed to conflict resolution, where price
agreement occurs as the main activity. Finally, the group will transcend to execution, which
would be defined as the agreement between the members to post a collective offer to the seller.
Interdependence
The essence of interdependence theory relies on the notion that group members are made
interdependent through the establishment and achievement of goals (Johnson and Johnson,
2005). Interdependence theory analyzes how the structure of the goals of participants in a
situation determines how they interact and the patterns of interaction determine the situational
outcomes (Deutsch, 1949a, Johnson and Johnson, 2005). These goal structures specify the type
of interdependence toward individual and collective goals, and through this interaction they can
promote or obstruct the goals of others (Johnson and Johnson, 2005).
Goal clarity was found to be a positive significant predictor of performance for software
development as was individual characteristics such as effort, ability and locus of control (Rasche
and Tossi, 1992). The latter factor, locus of control, i.e. the level of perceived control an
individual possesses, was shown specifically to be a significant positive predictor of
performance. Antecedents of interdependence include a variety of attributes, such as technology
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attributes, task requirements, environmental uncertainty, roles and responsibilities, skills of
individuals, goal definition and achievement, performance rewards and feedback (Van der Vegt
and Van de Vliert, 2001). These antecedents allow for interdependence to be structured as, task
interdependence, which represents the structural and interactive nature of actions, and goal
interdependence, which defines the related outcomes (Van der Vegt and Van de Vliert, 2001).
Even defining a structure of interdependence in this manner is limiting because much of
the work in interdependence fails to fully integrate the situational context, nature of interaction,
and the complex nature of participants engaged in the interdependent activity (Johnson and
Johnson, 2005). The use of a situational structure aids in understanding the specific interpersonal
reality that social cognitive activity is about, i.e. allowing for dimensional analysis of the social
situations in which these interactions occur (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). This situation
structure enables a deeper understanding of the situations or the specific problems and
opportunities presented, and the person with whom the interaction occurs and their goals and
motives (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). Furthermore, due to the dynamic nature of the
interdependence structure, the structure must specify the present reality of the situation and
historical perspectives of interaction (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002).
There are a number of attributes that help classify interdependence structure for groups.
First, members of the group’s ‘level of dependence’ may vary in the perception of the degree to
which they rely on others. John may have a higher degree of dependence on Mary if she can
cause "pleasure or pain" (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002) toward John, and if she has more control
over her actions. If Mary can unilaterally dismiss John's contributions or rate the contributions of
John, then she would exhibit a lower level of dependence on John, while John would exhibit a
higher level of dependence on Mary.
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Mutuality of dependence describes the degree to which two people are equally dependent
on one another (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). When workers possess a high degree of mutual
dependence, the results are the benefits achieved from a balance of power, reduction of the
threats and coercion and less reliance on norms and contracts leading to higher stability and
positive work satisfaction (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). Control theory states that controls are
created to align the divergent interests of a controller and controlee, and such controls are used to
counter opportunistic behavior by the controlee and that these controls can be formal or informal
(Tiwana and Keil, 2010). When groups exhibit high mutuality of dependence, informal controls
might be prevalent.
Basis of dependence describes how partner's outcomes affect another partner's outcome,
i.e. dependence derived from partner's outcomes. There are two types of controls that are found
in the basis of dependence, partner control and joint control (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002).
Assume that Mary's outcomes are reliant on John's outcomes, as would be the case in the group
buying scenario, i.e. both most have an accepted offer, the performance and output of the
dependent service could be considered a partner control, because the outcome of John's service
has a direct and considerable impact on Mary's outcomes. Whereas if Mary and John are
working more closely, and each of their outcomes are inextricably tied together, as might be the
case if they are jointly responsible, then their collective responsibility for a successful outcome is
joined.
Covariation of interests describes the degree to which partners’ outcomes correspond
(Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). When John's activities in developing a software service benefit
Mary in a similar manner, then their outcomes are considered to be perfectly corresponding. A
high degree of covariation helps to define the interaction between the participants based on
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predispositions to help them ascertain whether a current situation is good or bad. Conversely,
when situations with conflicting interests occur, e.g. when John's activities are perfectly
conflicting with Mary's, the situation activates emotions such as greed and fear, and thus Mary
might examine the situation questioning whether the situation is competitive or cooperative.
Finally, information sharing between members of the group can greatly impact the level
and nature of interaction (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002). Incomplete information can create an
environment of uncertainty and misunderstanding, leading to interaction difficulties (Kelley et al.
2002). In the presence of incomplete information, participants may be unable to effectively
interact with others on their team. Group buying participants might be unable to determine
outcomes for combinations of behavior. Further, incomplete information may hinder one's ability
to determine others goals and motives.
In summary, interdependence theory provides a theoretical foundation for understanding
the combination of social interaction among the group as well as the task-oriented nature. Group
buying represents an activity that is higher along these dimensions thereby requiring higher
levels of interdependence.
Decision-Making
As groups form, prospective buyers will only need to determine the price they are
collectively willing to offer. This process requires negotiation among the buyers, absent of any
communication with the seller. A review of the literature provides four relevant theories to study
this process (Wilson and Wilson, 1988). The first is the garbage can model, which suggests that
decisions are analogous to garbage cans where problems, solutions, ideas and other information
are placed rational mode (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). Since collective buying members
may not know each other at the start of a collective buying process, the garbage can model
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appears to be the most probable method for decision-making. Buyers will test each other’s
willingness to purchase, entice others to join the group, or disengage from the group.
The second theory is the political model where members compete for decision outcome
to satisfy personal interests (Pettigrew 1973; Pfeffer 1981). This model may not be as prevalent,
because this model infers some sort of personal gain beyond the purely maximizing utility
function (e.g. ego), which should not exist in economics. Furthermore, in the absence of social
cues due to electronic communication, anonymity will increase and therefore, may lead to more
equity and empowerment among participants (Sproull and Kiesler, 1986), thereby eliminating
dominant buyers.
The third model is the bounded rationality model, in which decision makers tend to be
rational but are constrained by cognitive limitations, habits and biases (March and Simon 1958;
Cyert and March 1963). This model will most likely be used when collective buying groups have
more experience in creating groups and determining prices. As the level of buyer’s experience
increases, the need for communication and probing should decrease.
Finally, collective buying groups could exhibit a purely rational model where decision
outcomes are chosen such that maximum benefit or utility is derived (Kepner and Tregoe 1965;
Allison 1971). Purely rational behavior seems the most optimal; however, group dynamics may
interfere with pure rational thinking.
Behaviors of individuals within a collective buying group is predicted to follow a
common path, and that this path exhibits less uncertainty over time. TIP theory (McGrath, 1991)
identifies three generic temporal problems, of which, two are relevant to collective buying.
Temporal ambiguity may exist in collective buying from both the product availability and the
need of the buyer. Individuals may join or leave a group at any time prior to an offer being made.
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Temporal conflicts, the second of three generic temporal problems, could occur when individual
group member’s time interests are different, which could effect the composition of groups. For
example, an individual may need a product sooner than the rate of negotiations among the group
and thereby seek to join a different group or obtain the product individually. Therefore, it will be
important to study the group formation effects of time. In an economic experiment, it is easy to
study the effect of temporal conditions by changing the time expectations for the auction in the
form of time pressures.
Impact of Media on Groups
Rha and Widdows (2002) explained the importance of organization and communication
are for countervailing power, and how the Internet serves to meet these demands. Technologies
that can facilitate socialization allow people with similar interests and shared values to form
virtual communities (Chiua, et al. 2006) share information in knowledge repositories
(Khanlanalli et al. 2005) and facilitate development of software in large open source
development projects (Kotlarsi, J. and Oshri, I. 2005).
Technology clearly facilitates communication thereby enhancing the opportunity to
organize but does it enhance the collaboration effect in collective buying, thereby affecting the
price positively for the buyers? In order to understand how technology plays a role in various
processes, a closer look at the theory of Task, Technology and Fit (TTF) (Goodhue and
Thompson, 1995) is warranted, which holds that IT is more likely to have a positive impact on
individual performance and be used if the capabilities of the IT match the tasks that the user must
perform. Zigurs and Buckland (1998) examined TTF in a group decision support setting and
focused on the tasks that were performed by individuals. Since task definition would be
important to determining the best fit for a group decision support system, the authors adapted the
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aggregated task categories and dimensions for determining the best fit of technology in a group
setting.
Using these task dimensions, the collaborative buying scheme would be defined as a
simple task, since the outcome and solution scheme are singular, and there is no conflicting
interdependence. Simple tasks would therefore be mapped, according to Zigurs and Buckland
(1998), to technology that is high in communication support, low in process structuring and low
in information processing.
In addition to understanding the fit of technology to the particular task, it is important to
assess the attributes of technologies that could better facilitate simple tasks such as collective
buying. Media Synchronicity Theory (Dennis, et al. 2008) helps identify which technologies are
best suited for particular tasks. MST provides a framework for two types of processes,
conveyance and convergence. Conveyance processes are the transmission of a diversity of new
information enabling the receiver to mentally understand the situation being presented (Dennis
et. al 2008). Conveyance processes involve more information processing and more cognitive
processing. In contrast, convergence processes requires less information processing and more
information transmission. In convergence processes, the individuals have a better understanding
of the situation and require less cognitive processing to reach a decision. Convergence requires
less deliberation, so in situations where individuals have a common understanding, encoding and
decoding familiar information should be faster (Minsky, 1986).
Assessment of technologies for use in conveyance and convergence processes therefore
provides a foundation for understanding technological attributes for this research. Media that is
lower in synchronicity is better for convergence processes, while media that is higher in
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synchronicity is better for conveyance processes. Therefore, the effects of different attributes of
media and its effects on performance in a collective buying setting is examined.
Finally, although the primary set of tasks could be considered simple, and the set of
technologies attributes could be aligned with convergence processes, it is anticipated that the
process will transition from conveyance to convergence, i.e. buyers who are new to the collective
buying will need more time to adapt to the different buying process and explore the technology
to see how it works. Therefore, initially the actual task is not simple but rather more
“judgmental” (Zigurs and Buckland, 1998) where the outcome and solution scheme is still
singular, but some conflicting interdependence will occur. This would require more information
processing, which would in turn require technology attributes more fitting for a conveyance
process. Over time, however, the level of information processing would fall, as buyers become
more experienced in collective buying, and therefore buyers would tend toward technologies that
are more appropriate for convergence processes.
Network Structures
Social Network Analysis itself is not a theory but a methodology for investigating social
structures and interactions between actors (Otte and Rousseau, 2002) and is derived from the
mathematical discipline of graph theory. The primary attributes of social networks focus on the
power of actors in a network an include degree, betweenness and closeness (Freeman, 1979).
Ties between actors can either be directed or undirected. Directed ties possess a direction
between the nodes, i.e. actor a initiates a bid joined by actor b. Undirected ties are those that
have no direction and simply indicate a connection between two nodes. Degree centrality refers
to how central an actor is to the network based on the number of ties they have. Thus actors with
high degree have a high number of connections to other nodes and are thus more central to the
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network than actors who have fewer nodes. Betweenness refers to a position of an actor that lies
between other actors and therefore acts as an intermediary between other actors thereby possibly
controlling the flow of information. Closeness refers to the distance of an actor to all others in
the network. Measures of closeness try to identify how close an actor is to every other actor
based on shortest path algorithms.
While much of the work in social network analysis focuses on the actors or primary
actors in a network, the measures described above can be transferred to the network as a whole
and thus are known as centralization measures, as opposed to centrality measures (Scott and
Carrington, 2011). The social structure of small networks is an important attribute, and therefore,
for group buying, the focus will be on the centralization of the network and the characteristics
that describe the network as a whole. Interdependence theory posts that the covariance of
interests and the dependent nature of the actors should have some form of balance, and increased
communication should promote the balance (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002).
Replication in Experimental Economics
Replication in experimental economics is vital toward understanding the how theories
work. Smith (1994) notes that replication and control are the two primary means by which
attempts are made to reduce the error in our common knowledge of the economic processes. A
review of the literature found a number of replication studies being performed such as those in
coordination and competition (George and Zhange, 2013), effect of messages on payoff in
competition (Deck et al., 2013), combinatorial auctions experiments (Scheffel et al. 2012),
conditional cooperation (Herrmann and Thoni, 2008), and monetary incentive effects
(Kachelmeyer and Towry, 2004).
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Recently, the journal Research in Experimental Economics dedicated an entire journal
toward replicated studies (Volume 18) citing in the call for papers, "that there appears to be a
perception in the profession that replication is often marginalized in favor of new statistically
significant results." In following the guidelines set for by Smith (1994), Experimental
economists should perform replications and so that results can be compared with replications of
previous studies. Furthermore, these replications are seldom, pure replications, i.e. with the exact
same procedures, subject type, and other procedures. The lack of replication overall lead
Hamerhesh (2007) to provide guidelines for incentives to journal editors for the promotion of
replication studies. He argues that with the current reward structure it is unreasonable to expect
junior or even mid-level researchers to undertake replication studies. Even senior economists are
unlikely to undertake replications without incentives beyond those that have been provided.
Replication studies, especially in economics must be conducted since there may be differences
across institutions, different economies, different temporal aspects, etc. (Hamerhesh, 2007).
While this study does not deviate significantly in terms of the attributes described by
Hamerhesh (2007), it is important to note that from the information economics, variations might
become apparent from the user interface. Information technology theories focus on the IT artifact
and simply ignoring or trivializing changes to the IT artifact could be detrimental to our
knowledge of the economic theories and how they are impacted by technology. It is widely
known that richer technology tends to transmit more social cues and offer more means of
communication between team members (Daft and Lengel, 1986; Daft et al., 1987; Chidambaram
and Jones, 1993). In addition, the IT artifact may also change the level of synchronicity, which
can impact the type of task at hand (Dennis et al., 2008). Using this approach, this study is
exploring the principles of design science —designing an IT artifact, i.e. an IT-enabled market
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mechanism for electronic group-buying platforms), implementing it, and then evaluating it
(using economic performance measures). Changes to the IT-artifact as demonstrated with this
study, offers more insight into the design of the interfaces for electronic markets, and thus
provides more detail of how the market might be effected by changes in the IT artifact.
Information technology replication studies are not very common, however, there is an
increasing call for theses studies. Dennis and Valacich (2014) have strongly advocated that
Information Systems replication studies be conducted to enhance the discipline. They categorize
three types of replications. The first category is exact replication, in which the study is conducted
in the same manner in terms of method and context. The second category is methodological
replications in which the same methods are used in a different context. Finally, conceptual
replications are replication studies that test similar or identical research questions, but whose
measures, treatments, analysis and or context are different. Dennis and Valacich(2014) consider
conceptual replications as the strongest form of replication, because they allow additional
analysis of the concept being studied, while maintaining the experiments original intent. It allows
for differences to ensure that wordings of items, execution of treatment or methods of analysis
are consistent across studies.
Therefore, using the guidelines for experimental economics, this study will attempt to
replicate the findings from the first study with slight variations to either reinforce the findings, or
provide alternative reasons in the event of failure. From an information technology perspective,
the interface is slightly altered, and additionally, from a control perspective group size is static,
but groups are allowed to form dynamically, while manipulating the presence of a
communication mechanism.
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Hypothesis Development
The previous studies sought to examine the relationship of the communication channel
and buyer profit and time to task completion. In the first study, it was found that communication
capacity had no effect on buyer profit, but an effect on time to task completion was present. In
the second study, with the presence of competition, the main effect of the presence of the
communication channel was found to not effect buyer surplus, but did delay time to task
completion. Therefore, the first two hypotheses are replicated from the previous studies

Hypothesis 1: Introducing a communication channel for buyers to exchange private messages
will tend to increase buyer surplus.
Hypothesis 2: Introducing a communication channel for buyers to exchange private messages
will tend to delay group task completion.

Next, attention turns to the structure of the network. This study applies social network
analysis techniques to small groups. Thus, a set of exploratory hypotheses is developed. As
mentioned before, the focus of this study is on centralization attributes of the network, i.e. the
structure of the network as a whole. From interdependence theory (Rusbult and VanLange,
2002), tasks that are highly interdependent and that the more connections each actor has the
better they are able to coordinate efforts. Further, if no nodes are truly central to the network then
lower degree centralization should yield a more balanced network, which should increase the
interdependence and increase overall performance of each buyer, and the group as a whole. The
network should also exhibit low betweenness centralization, i.e. no single actor should act as an
intermediary. The presence of a communication channel in which all buyers are able to
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communicate to each other should ensure this. Finally, the paths from any actor to another
should be relatively short, and there should be a relative closeness distributed among the nodes.
Networks of this type should not have any actor that dominates or is central to the network and
therefore closeness should be relative low, since all actors should have the same number of
paths. The network in this study in which all actors engage evenly with other actors is described
as a wheel or all channel network as described by Freeman (1979), shown in Table X. The
attributes of the network should be a degree centralization of 0, betweenness centralization of 0,
and closeness centralization of 0.

Figure 7: Wheel or All Channel Network (Freeman, 1979).
Since the presence of a communication channel will increase the ability of buyers to coordinate,
it is expected that the communication channel should enhance the network characteristics and
create more balance networks and thus:

Exploratory Hypothesis 3: In the presence of a communication channel networks will have
lower degree centralization.
Exploratory Hypothesis 4: In the presence of a communication channel networks will have
lower betweenness centralization.
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Exploratory Hypothesis 5: In the presence of a communication channel networks will have
lower closeness centralization.

These characteristics of the network should have an impact on buyer surplus and time to
task completion. Networks that are lower in the network attributes should be more balanced and
achieve better buyer surplus, but more balanced networks need more time to coordinated due to
the lack of centralization and therefore time to task completion should be slower. Thus the
following hypotheses are derived:

Buyer Surplus Hypothesis

Exploratory Hypothesis 6: Networks with lower degree centralization will achieve higher buyer
surplus than networks that are higher in degree centralization.
Exploratory Hypothesis 7: Networks with lower betweenness centralization will achieve higher
buyer surplus than networks that are higher in betweenness centralization.
Exploratory Hypothesis 8: Networks with lower closeness centralization will achieve higher
buyer surplus than networks that are higher in closessness centralization.

Time to Task Completion Hypothesis

Exploratory Hypothesis 9: Networks with lower degree centralization will have slower time to
task completion than networks that are higher in degree centralization.
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Exploratory Hypothesis 10: Networks with lower betweenness centralization will have slower
time to task completion than networks that are higher in betweenness centralization.
Exploratory Hypothesis 11: Networks with lower closeness centralization will have slower time
to task completion than networks that are higher in closessness centralization.
4.3 Methodology
Experimental Design
Using a specific variant of the buyer-initiated intra-auction group-buying model proposed
by Chen et al. (Chen et al., 2009), the economic experiment creates electronic social buying
market in the laboratory where participants are asked to coordinate group purchases of a single
product from a monopolistic seller. Each individual buyer is given a demand of one unit with a
pre-assigned unique willingness-to-pay value. These valuations vary across buyers, thus
modeling heterogeneous consumer demand preferences. Buyers are pre-assigned to groups. The
experimental environment is developed using the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and was
implemented in a Windows client-server networked environment. The participants will be
recruited from a university in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States.
In this experiment, participants will be compensated with a performance payout.
Performance payouts are essential increase external validity, by creating a value for performance
in the game as noted by the induced value theory (Smith, 1976). Participants are guaranteed a
minimum level of compensation, i.e. $5, but will be allowed to earn additional compensation
based on their performance of the game. Using previous experimental runs the value of the
payouts will be set at .116 cents per dollar earned in the game. This represents the average
surplus achieved by previous experimental sessions, which did not have payouts. The payouts
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were funded by a doctoral student grant of $1500 from Baruch College, and participants will be
continually recruited until the grant money has been completely depleted.
The study uses a similar interface that was used in the first study, however the interface
has been altered. Due to the payout limitation, the only manipulation conducted in these sessions
will be the inclusion or exclusion of the communication box. While this by itself represents a 1x2
factorial design, there are some additional areas for analysis. First, an examination of the data
from this interface, representing technology that is richer and of higher synchronicity will be
compared to the data collected from the other studies. In addition, providing payouts in this study
represents another significant difference from the first study. This presents a valid approach as
per Smith (1994), and further supported by Dennis and Valacich (2014), that replication need not
be a pure replication, but rather to replicate results using different environments in an effort to
strengthen the economic theory being tested. More importantly, this study includes a post
experiment survey that was obtained to determine the users opinions regarding feelings of trust,
information overload, and social presence.
Participants are brought into the experimental session and randomly assigned to stations.
Participant’s stations were assigned to separate groups of 5. This study focuses on competition,
by limiting group formation for bids to 3, i.e. only 3 people will be allowed to form a bid, at
which point the bid is sent to the automated seller. Some groups will be presented with a
communication channel, while other groups will not have a communication channel in which to
communicate with other buyers.
Additionally, the seller function has been automated. In this experiment, the automated
seller selects a random number, selected from a normal distribution (µ=50,s.d.=5) as the
“acceptable selling price”. It should be noted a new number is selected in each round. When 3

	
  

	
   94	
  

buyers form a bid, the bid is sent to the seller, which is then either accepted or rejected, if it
matches or is above the “acceptable selling price”. If the bid price is below the “acceptable
selling price”, the seller waits ten seconds before rejecting the bid. This delay is to simulate a
“decision”, since buyers were not told that the seller was automated.
As depicted in the flow chart (included as Appendix A), which shows the basic logical
sequence of the events and decisions in the experiment, buyer subjects can either place an
opening bid (the first proposed purchasing price to be offered to the seller) or join an already
existing bid within the group. However, a group offer is not routed to the seller until the required
number of buyers (minimum buyer threshold) has joined the offer at the proposed bid price.
Hence, group bidding occurs in two stages, requiring the completion of two group tasks.
The first task involves proposing bids, among themselves, to determine an agreed joint
offer bid. The bargaining process with the seller begins after the first task has been completed
and a joint offer submitted to the seller. Successfully negotiating with the seller and making the
deal presents the second group task in our study. If the seller rejects an offer, the buyers need to
renegotiate a new, improved bid. This process continues until the seller either accepts an offer
and closes the deal (the group successfully completes the task) or the experimental round
terminates when time expires, without making a deal (the group fails to successfully complete
the task).
Procedure
Each session consisted of groups with 5 prospective buyers. Upon entering the lab, the
participants are randomly assigned to computer terminals with a buyer screen for the buyers.
Once the participants are seated, they are asked to review a set of instructions that explains the
electronic group-buying mechanism and the user interface for their specific role as a buyer.
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Participants are not told who is a buyer, however, the moderator of the experiment indicated to
each participant that they would be given a set of instructions based on their role as either a
buyer or seller, even though everyone was a buyer. The session consisted of one extended
practice period and ten experimental periods, where buyers worked to coordinate group offers to
the seller. The data from the practice round will be discarded and not used in analysis. Each
regular round lasted 210 seconds, three and a half minutes, which represented an increase in time
by one minute from the previous studies. This change was implemented to give the buyers more
time to coordinate activity.
The seller receives only finalized group bids, once a group has agreed on a joint offer. If
the bid price matches or is above the “acceptable selling price”, generated automatically, the bid
will be accepted and the buyers will win the auction at the price of the bid. If the bid is below the
“acceptable selling price”, the offer will be rejected after ten seconds, and buyers can work on a
new, improved joint offer if their bid is not accepted.
The buyer screen is more complex than the screen used in the first study (as illustrated in
Appendix D). It shows the buyers the assigned willingness-to-pay (WTP) value of the product
they are asked to buy. With the beginning of each round, a buyer can initiate a bid, or wait and
join an existing bid price. When three of the five buyers in the group join a bid, a group offer was
generated and immediately forwarded to the seller for review. In any case, a new bid price can be
proposed at any time. Buyers observe the market by looking at the current bids, pending offers,
and also by learning from declined offers. In the treatment with a private communication channel
buyers are able to exchange text messages via an instant message type of communication box.
When a transaction occurs, i.e. a seller accepts an offer from the buyer group, due to the
bid price matching or exceeding the “acceptable bid price” (completing group task 2), the
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buyer’s profit will calculated and shown to the participants. Buyers that win will be shown their
profit and a signal that they have won the auction, achieved by a large green box that says “YOU
WON”. Buyers that were not in the group will be shown a 0 profit and a large red box that says
“YOU LOSE”. Individual buyer profits (buyer surplus) are computed for each buyer as
transaction price less WTP value. Summing individual buyer profits over the members of a
group yields group profit, which is not shown to the buyers, but used in the data analysis. No
profits accrue for buyers who are not in successful bids, when a round ends. The subject rewards
were not linked to task completion time.
In each period of the ten repeated rounds of the experiment, the buyers are given different
WTP values, generated randomly, and rotated to buyers sequentially in each period (as detailed
in Appendix B). First, 10 random integer numbers are generated between 25 and 100 from a
uniform distribution. These 10 numbers are then recorded and reused for all of the 10 repeated
rounds for all experimental groups in order to experimentally control for WTP effects. In the
first round of the experiment, the first five numbers are assigned to the five group buyers
sequentially, and in the second round, the next five values, starting from the second number, are
assigned to the buyers sequentially, and so on. This WTP rotation method ensures that every
buyer receives all of the ten generated values over the course of the ten repeated rounds and,
additionally, that for any given round all buyers have also different values.
Measures
In following the first two studies, one experimental treatment variable, presence of the
communication channel, is manipulated. Two dependent variables, group-level profit, measured
as average buyer profit within groups, and group performance are also investigated in terms of
time for group task completion, identified as the time to successful completion and acceptance
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by seller of a bid. Additionally, network structures will be analyzed from the theoretical
perspectives provided by Freeman (1979). The study will examine the centralization
characteristics of the network in order to determine the effects of communication on centrality.
Furthermore, these dependent measures will also be used as independent measures juxtaposed to
the primary dependent variables of buyer profit and time to task completion.
4.4 Data Analysis
Experimental variables
Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

Control Variables

Communication level (CC = yes or no)
Buyer profit
Time to Task completion (accepted bid)
Centralization Betweenness
Centralization Closeness
Centralization Degree
Time pressure (auction length = 210 seconds)
Experimental periods (P1, P2, …, P10 = 0 or 1)

Table 19. Experimental variables
Descriptive analysis
The experiment was carried out with a total of 21 groups. Groups were comprised of five
potential buyers. Data was collected from each group over 10 rounds of the collective bidding,
representing a typical 1x2 factorial design with repeated measures. Out of the 210 rounds over
the 21 groups, task completion occurred with 137 bids from 21 groups, that is, those bids that
were successful and accepted by a seller. The remaining 73 rounds did not generate a sales
transaction groups for two reasons. Either the buyers could not agree on common bid to form a
group offer (group coordination failure) or the submitted bids were too low and rejected by the
seller (price setting failure). Table 2 shows the number of successful bids and the groups that
generated them broken down by experimental treatments are shown in Table X.
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Communication Channel
No

Yes

65 (10)

72 (11)

Table 20: Bids per Manipulation (Groups)
Hypothesis testing
Test of Related Hypotheses From Previous Studies
The examination of the effect of the communication channel on performance from a
buyer surplus perspective and a time to completion perspective continues to prove interesting. In
the first study, the presence of the communication channel was found to be significant in
negatively affecting buyer surplus (i.e. buyer surplus reduced with increased communication),
and in the second study this effect was not found to be significant. With respect to time to task
completion, the first study found a significant positive effect on task completion, i.e. the
communication effect increased the time to completion, and the second study found a no similar
effect (p<.1). The difference between those two studies was the presence of completion and the
nature of group formation. .
Dummy coding was used to convert the categorical variable communication (CC) into a
dichotomous variable. Specifically, for the treatment without the availability of a communication
channel CC was coded as “1”, and with communication channel CC=“2”. An additional 9
dummy variables (P1, P2, …, P9) were implemented to represent the experimental periods 2 to
10, while “period” 1 serves as the reference measure. Two separate regression tests were
conducted to analyze the proposed hypotheses on the two dependent variables “(buyer) profit”
and on “time (for task completion)” respectively.

	
  

	
   99	
  

The results of the two separate linear tests are combined in table 21, one test for buyer
profits, aggregated across buyers and rounds, and the other test on the time for task completion.
In order to examine the contribution of main effects, a hierarchical multiple linear regression was
performed in three stages, “Model 1”, and “Model 2”, in which the control variables, “period”,
the main effects “communication channel”, were added. The 9 dummy variables, P2 through
P10 are included in the test in order to control the effect of repeated measurement (round
effects). The coefficients of P2 through P10 indicate the differences in profit or time between a
specific period and the reference period 1. By statistically controlling for the effects of repeated
measures, more valid results regarding the treatment effects are obtained.
Examining the regression models with respect to buyer profit, the communication
channel is not significant. The model satisfies all the assumptions of OLS, but no main effect is
present (p>.10), validating the findings from the second study. With respect to time for task
completion, as with buyer profit, the main effect was found not to be significant (p>.10). Upon
further analysis, however, it was found that the normality of residuals under OLS was violated.
After numerous attempts to transform the dependent variable, it was found that that a log
transformation of the dependent variable provided for the validation of assumptions of OLS.
Furthermore, the results after this transformation show no support of a negative effect of
communication on the log of time to completion (p=.07).

Model 1

	
  

Model 2

Profit

Time

Profit

Time

Log(Time)

Intercept

15.29**

116.33**

15.36**

159.64**

5.10**

P2

-1.41

-41.98**

-1.39

-54.37*

-.068

P3

5.04*

-39.45*

5.06*

-93.00**

-1.40**

P4

3.49†

-50.94**

3.52†

-94.39**

-1.48**
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P5

2.42

-70.57**

2.45

-85.39**

-1.09*

P6

1.04

-74.97**

1.08

-102.81**

-1.40**

P7

6.54**

-77.97**

6.58**

-102.87**

-1.50**

P8

6.03**

-80.72**

6.06**

-102.44**

-1.38**

P9

-3.51

-80.95**

-3.48

-55.36*

-.80†

P10

6.84**

-52.00**

6.87**

-37.34

-.34

-.18

-13.70

-.29†

CC
F
2

Adj R
2

∆R -Profit

4.149**

5.18

6.897**

4.29**

3.34

.188

.169

.302

.195

.158

.188

2

∆R -Time
Normality
(Shapiro-Wilk)

.114
.169

.37

<.01

.007
.36

<.01

.073

Table 21: Multiple Linear Regression
** - p <.01, * - p<.05 † - p<.10

The differences found in this study can be attributed to two unique elements presented.
First, there is a different form of competition in the study resulting in dynamic group formation.
Dynamic group formation represents a form of competition and competition was found to have
an effect on performance. Second, this study uses an automated seller for bid acceptance, and
thus the average buyer profit was lower. In this study the average buyer profit was 17.86 without
communication and 18.08 with communication, whereas the average buyer profit in the previous
study with communication was 20.74 without communication and 19.98 with communication.
Social Network Analysis
In order to develop a picture of how individuals react in these groups, social network
analysis techniques were performed using the connections between individuals who formed
successful bids, i.e. bids accepted by the seller. The resulting analysis of triads, i.e. three buyers
that formed a bid, enables us to see whether patterns emerged for winning bids over the course of
the simulation. SNA metrics were collected for each group over their ten periods, and then
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compared to other groups. Each time a successful bid was made and accepted by the seller, the
connections between each member of the triad is considered an edge between the nodes (buyer),
and a value of 1 is given. The procedure constituted tallying each one of these edges in a matrix,
for each group. The resulting matrix represented a weighted non-directional adjacency matrix.
Table 22 provides an adjacency matrix for one of the runs during the session. The table shows
the number of edges formed between each of the buyers. For example, it can be shown in the
table that Buyer 2 formed a successful bid with Buyer 1 three times. Note that in the case where
a single buyer would have been successful in every bid, the total number of edges, i.e. the sum of
the row or column for the buyer, would be equal to 20, since they would have two edges, i.e.
connected to two buyers, in each of the ten periods.
1

2

3

4

5

1

-

3

1

4

4

2

3

-

3

1

3

3

1

3

-

0

2

4

4

1

0

-

3

5

4

3

2

3

-

Table 22: Adjacency matrix for single experimental run (130823_1430_1)
	
  

Once all the edges were tallied, their corresponding weights were calculated as a measure

of all connections in the graph. Figure 8, shows the diagram for the adjacency matrix above.
Lines in the graph are weighted for visual effect, and the number on the line represents the ratio
of the edges between two buyers over the total number of edges. One can easily see the triads
that form, and the relative strength of the triads, in the group.
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Figure 8: Network diagram for single experimental run
Social Network Analysis focuses on the interrelationship between the actors (or nodes),
which are represented by the edges between the nodes. In examining a network, focus is targeted
on measures of centralization including degree, betweenness, closeness, are meant to describe
the relative power of a node in the network. Specifically, for this study the examination of the
structure of the network in relation to buyer profit is critical. Table 23 provides a listing of the
metrics for all the groups in the study.
Experimental
Run

	
  

Comm

Avg
Edge
Weight

Clusters

Maximum
Clique

Clique
Number

Central.
Degree

Central
Between

Central
Closeness

1

Yes

1.00

3

3

3

0.20

.000

.156

2

Yes

2.40

1

1

5

0.00

.000

.000

3

Yes

1.33

1

2

4

0.10

.028

.233

4

Yes

2.40

1

1

5

0.00

.000

.000

5

Yes

2.67

1

2

4

0.10

.028

.233
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6

Yes

3.33

1

2

4

0.10

.028

.233

7

No

1.20

2

3

3

0.25

.063

.240

8

No

2.10

1

1

5

0.00

.000

.000

9

No

3.00

2

2

4

0.15

.000

.175

10

No

2.70

1

1

5

0.00

.000

.000

11

Yes

2.70

1

1

5

0.00

.000

.000

12

No

3.00

1

2

4

0.20

.125

.428

13

No

2.14

1

3

3

0.30

.188

.583

14

Yes

3.00

2

2

4

0.15

.000

.175

15

No

2.70

1

1

5

0.00

.000

.000

16

No

2.00

1

2

4

0.10

.028

.233

17

No

1.50

1

2

4

0.20

.125

.428

18

Yes

3.00

1

1

5

0.00

.000

.000

19

No

2.70

1

1

5

0.00

.000

.000

20

Yes

2.67

1

2

4

0.10

.028

.233

Mean

2.38

1.25

1.75

4.25

.098

.032

.168

Mean w/o Comm

2.19

1.36

1.91

4.09

.127

.048

.204

Mean w/ Comm

2.45

1.30

1.70

4.3

.075

.0112

.126

Table 23: Calculated network measures by group.
	
  

For the network groups above, the average degree centralization for the graph was .098.

When degree centralization is low, thus no single node or groups of nodes dominate the graph.
When comparing the mean degree centralization of groups (µ =.127) without communication and
with communication (µ=.075), there appears to be stronger node centralization when there is no
communication, however, the Anova test of the two groups finds no statistical difference
between the groups (F=1.09, p=.31). Therefore no relationship is found as described by EH3.
Analyzing the betweenness centralization of the network, the data shows that the overall
betweenness (µ =.032) there exists a difference in the mean betweenness of the groups with
communication (µ =.011) and without (µ =.04), (F=3.466, p=.079), EH4 is therefore not
conclusive. Betweenness centralization refers to the existence of nodes that act as gatekeepers
for the network, i.e. the act as conduits between actors in the network. While the overall
betweenness is not strong, the difference between the groups is interesting. It suggests the
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communication channel might enable actors in the network to coordinate their activities better,
and that the bidding activities such as price negotiations occur through the channel rather than
through the bidding process.
Closeness centralization is an indicator of whether a central actor exists. The mean for
closeness centralization (µ =.168). The anova analysis found no difference between the means
with communication (µ =.126) and without (µ =.204). Overall no actor appears to act central to
the network, and that the presence of a communication channel has no impact (F=1.59, p=.296).
Therefore, no evidence of a relationship appears to exist between closeness and the
communication channel
Ultimately, it is important to determine whether these network characteristics have an
impact on performance of the group. Regression analysis was used to determine the impact of
average buyer profit based on betweenness, closeness and degree of the network, controlling for
the presence of the communication channel. The results presents some evidence, although not
conclusive, of a negative relationship between centralization degree and average total profit for
the buyers (p=.08), with the overall model not being significant (F=2.036, p=.14). Due to the
weakness of the model with the other network related variables, an alternate model was produced
removing these, and it clearly demonstrated a stronger relationship between average buyer profit
and degree (F=3.401, p=.057), but still no support is provided for EH7. This negative
relationship between degree and profit, articulates the notion that in a network where no node
dominates the network, i.e. lower degree, average buyer profit increases, providing evidence of
an effect of higher levels collaboration on average buyer profit. The results provided no evidence
around the relationships described in EH7, betweenness and buyer profit, or EH8, closeness and
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buyer profit. Furthermore, the presence of the communication appeared to have no effect on the
buyer profit.
With respect to time to completion, i.e. successful accepted bid, the network related
variables appear to have more significance. The model shows that each of the network
characteristics is significant at a p<.1 level, with degree being the strongest, (p<.01), and
betweenness being the weakest (p<.1), providing evidence of a relationship as described in EH9
and EH10. Similar to the previous analysis with average buyer profit, the network degree has a
strong negative relationship with time to completion.

Model 1

Alt Mod

Profit

Time

Profit

Intercept

51.68**

57.96**

54.86**

CC

2.13

-1.53

-.25

Degree

-126.28† -71.51**

-77.83*

Betweenness

93.40

-69.49†

Closeness

8.11

39.89*

F

2.036

7.32**

Adj R

.179

.57

3.401†
(p=.057)
.202

Normality
(Shapiro-Wilk)

.93

.80

.66

2

Table 24: Multiple Regression Models, including reduced model
** - p<.01, * - p<.05 , † - p <.10

Betweenness refers to the presence of nodes as gatekeepers of the network, and that
information must pass between them on the shortest path to other nodes. The betweenness values
for the network were relatively low, meaning that information doesn’t necessarily need to pass
through particular nodes in order to get to other nodes. When the impact of this on time to
completion is examined, the results show a weak negative relationship (p<.1), and is therefore
not supported. When nodes act as gatekeepers between other nodes in the network the time to
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completion will decrease, because these nodes lie between the other actors and could be
significant in terms of their participation. Finally, the results provide evidence of an opposite
than believed relationship on time to task completion described by EH11. Closeness
centralization refers to the way information is passed between nodes, i.e. as the closeness
centralization number approaches 0, every node passes information to every other node in the
same number of steps.
Summary of Hypothesis Tests

H1
H2
EH3
EH4
EH5

EH6
EH7
EH8

EH9
EH10
EH11

Communication Effects
(Communication-Capacity—Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Introducing a communication
channel for buyers to exchange private messages will tend to increase buyer surplus..

Evidence
No

(Communication-Capacity—Task-Completion Hypothesis): Introducing a communication
No
channel for buyers to exchange private messages will tend to delay group task completion.
Network Characteristics
In the presence of a communication channel networks will have lower degree centralization. No
In the presence of a communication channel networks will have lower betweenness
centralization.
In the presence of a communication channel networks will have lower closeness
centralization.

No
No

Network Characteristics –
Buyer Profit
Networks with lower degree centralization will achieve higher buyer surplus than networks
No
that are higher in degree centralization.
Networks with lower betweenness centralization will achieve higher buyer surplus than
networks that are higher in degree centralization.
Networks with lower closeness centralization will achieve higher buyer surplus than
networks that are higher in degree centralization.
Network Characteristics –
Time to Task Completion
Networks with lower degree centralization will have slower time to task completion than
networks that are higher in degree centralization..
Networks with lower betweenness centralization will have slower time to task completion
than networks that are higher in degree centralization.

No
No.

Yes
No.

Networks with lower closeness centralization will have slower time to task completion than
networks that are higher in degree centralization. Reverse found to be significant with
No
support at p<.05

Table 25: Summary of Hypotheses
Interestingly, the results show that higher closeness results in faster time to completion,
meaning that some nodes need to be central to the network or closer to the center, i.e.
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information passes through a central node. This could be due to the necessity of some form of
coordination. For example, some of the bidders must be more active in bidding so that others in
the network can follow. Once again, however, the presence of the communication channel had
no effect on the results.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The study combines experimental economics, information systems and social network
analysis and for the purpose of evaluating market mechanisms. Similar to the second study, this
study also offers a further elaboration on Ku et al.‘s (2005) competitive arousal model for
decision making (Galbraith, 1952) introducing a group-decision making problem with
communication level as an antecedent. However, the effect of this study replicates findings of
prior research conducted and provides for an examination of the social structures inherent in
group buying platforms, and IT enabled market platforms in general. This study contributes to
the increasing social commerce literature by attempting to explain network characteristics,
bidding outcomes and group dynamics in electronic group buying.
The results confirm results from previous studies with respect to buyer profit and time to task
completion. The effect of the communication channel tends to slow down groups time to
completion and has no effect on the buyer surplus. This study provided a replication of the
earlier studies modifying the user interface slightly and introducing a different form of
competition, along with performance payouts for incentivized participation.
The network characteristics provide some significant insight into the behavior of the
group dynamics since this study allows groups to form dynamically. Theoretically, it is given
according to Freeman (1979) that a network such as this should be completely balanced and thus
he provides theoretical values for centralization measures such as degree, betweenness and
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closeness. With interdependence theory, it should become apparent that groups that are more
interdependent should benefit from the inclusion of a communication channel. While the results
are mixed, i.e. not all the network level hypotheses were confirmed, the results are promising. It
is noted that the hypotheses relating to betweenness were both confirmed, and thus the
experiment might be more sensitive to betweenness characteristics of networks. Future research
should closely examine these network characteristics, and design studies to study these
relationships more closely.
The study suffers from a few important limitations. Similar to the previous studies, the
level of time pressure was held constant across all treatments. Manipulating time pressure could
yield additional insights on the network effect. Second, the hypotheses developed are labeled as
exploratory, and, as such, stronger theoretical foundations should be developed for more rigorous
hypotheses development. Next, the study was limited in the group size of 3, with 5 buyers. As
networks increase, different effects could be realized. Additional literature review should provide
insight into how larger groups might interact, and the effect could be analyzed. Since large IT
enabled markets are more realistic, the results of those finding could be more generalizable.
Finally, the study however has key practical implications for designers of group
buying platforms and operators of group buying sites. Understanding the network structure
between buyers is critical since many social buying sites rely on these structures as their core
business, e.g. Groupon. The results of understanding how communication effects these networks
large and small, can impact not only group buying sites, but could also be critical to emergency
services departments that rely on networks to disseminate information and require citizens to
actively perform a task during an emergency. While the ad-hoc belief is that increased
communication and well balanced network would be better for group coordination, these results

	
  

109	
  
	
  

indicate a potential problem with assessment, and therefore, future findings on this result could
be critical to understanding electronic group behavior.
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5. Examining Communication Patterns in IT Enabled Markets– Study 4
5.1 Introduction
The core element of Social buying, or group-buying, lies in the ability of groups to
dynamically form, and communicate information to other buyers in an effort to in coordinate
activity in the form of organizing a collective bid, and is an important an emerging aspect of
social commerce (Liang and Turban, 2012). Industry examples of group-buying businesses
include early ventures like Mercata, which ceased operation by 2004, as well as more recent ones
like Living Social and Groupon. Understanding the emotions and feelings of individual buyers in
these groups provides insight toward predicting future behaviors. This study focuses on the
content of messages from buyers to other buyers in a group buying experiment.
From a theoretical perspective, the study is motivated by research on IT-enabled
coordination, viewing social communication on group-buying platforms as a new form of an ITenabled coordination mechanism. Consumer behavior and economically based research of online
activities is fairly abundant, including research focusing on the attitudes toward online
purchasing as an effect on intention to return or intention to purchase (Bellman, et al. 1999;
Koufaris, 2002). Utilizing a group-buying model as another form of electronic commerce a
deeper analysis of consumers communication can shed insight into activities and tasks that are
considered interdependent.
Economics traditionally has sought to understand unbalanced economic power. Although
Galbraith’s theory of countervailing power (1952) seeks to explain a mechanism by which
groups, not individual consumers, can respond to unbalanced economic power, However, the
technological advances in recent years, through increased communication, could make
countervailing power possible for consumers in the form of group-buying electronic markets
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coupled (Rha and Widdows, 2002). Countervailing power theory explains the evolution of
countervailing power as a condition in which the existence of strong buyers would evolve as a
response to aggregation of power by sellers, and furthermore that this evolution would “occur
not in lockstep but as a response to the other” (Galbraith, 1952). Unfortunately at the time, it was
not envisioned that consumers could exercise this power due to significant coordination and
communication costs.
The economic literature is sometimes at odds with psychological literature with respect to
the value of emotions in understanding economic theory. Principally, rational choice theory
dominates the economic literature. However, in 1979, Khaneman and Tversky first explored
from a psychological perspective the cognitive aspects of economic decision-making.
Khaneman’s research would later win him the Nobel Prize in Economics. Rabin (1998) states
that the economic literature focuses on “logic and precision” and that ignoring behavioral aspects
is not beneficial, and could be the result of institutional complacency. Others have argued
further that simply using cognitive aspects of psychology for economic research is not enough,
and they argue for more analysis with respect to emotions. Elster (1998) argues that more work
in emotion theory should be performed to answer critical emotional questions such as “How can
emotions help us explain behavior for which good explanations seem to be lacking.
This paper analyzes the messages conducted from the three previous experimental
sessions. In those sessions where buyers were given a channel in which they could communicate
with other buyers, the messages were collected and analyzed to examine the type of messages
such as price messages or emotional messages. With the availability of the rich message data,
this study will examine the message counts, and content to ascertain if there are any patterns that
are being exhibited among the individuals vying to form a group. With this data, patterns such as
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the disclosure of private information, and negotiation, may provide insight into how the groups
will perform both at an economic performance level as well as time to task completion task level.
5.2 Theoretical Perspective and Hypothesis Development
Economics of Group Buying
Group buying sites such as Mercata and Groupon have sought to capitalize on the notion
that consumers would actively engage in coordination activities in an attempt to obtain lower
prices. The core element of Social buying, or group-buying, lies in the ability of groups to
dynamically form, and communicate information to other buyers in an effort to coordinate
activity in the form of organizing a collective bid, and is an important and emerging aspect of
social commerce (Liang and Turban, 2012). Coordination between consumers is highly
dependent on their ability to communicate some information to other buyers either directly
through messages or through some technical mechanism that controls the coordination process.
Understanding the emotions and feelings of individual buyers in these groups could provide
insight toward predicting future behaviors. Consumer behavior and economically based research
of online activities is fairly abundant, including research focusing on the attitudes toward online
purchasing as an effect on intention to return or intention to purchase (Bellman, et al. 1999;
Koufaris, 2002).
Countervailing Power Theory
Countervailing Power theory states that unbalanced economic power can be “held in
check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it” (Galbraith, 1952). The theory
explains the evolution of countervailing power as a condition in which the existence of strong
buyers would evolve as a response to aggregation of power by sellers, and furthermore that this
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evolution would “occur not in lockstep but as a response to the other” (Galbraith, 1952). One
key limitation to the theory recognized by Galbraith was the inability of consumers to exercise
countervailing power even though it was conceivably possible (Galbraith, 1952; Rha and
Widdows 2002). The only mechanism that was viewed as viable for consumers was through the
introduction of intermediaries such as wholesalers and retailers, who had more organizational
capability.
Rha and Widdows (2002) found that consumers in the early 1990’s organized to drive
down prices of heating fuel in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania through the formation of the Public
Interest Research Group (PIRG) for Fuel Buying. The difficulty for consumers to attain critical
mass was a key challenge for the group, which brought into question of how broadly the concept
of countervailing power, theoretical or practical, could be applied. In order for consumers to
achieve success, consumers would need to be better organized and would require more
simplified communication among buyers. The challenge for consumers they found in
organization and coordination was due to the complexity and variety of communication
possibilities that needed to be transmitted and interpreted.
Interdependence
The essence of interdependence theory relies on the notion that group members are made
interdependent through the establishment and achievement of goals (Johnson and Johnson,
2005). Interdependence theory analyzes how the structure of the goals of participants in a
situation determines how they interact and the patterns of interaction determine the situational
outcomes (Deutsch, 1949a, Johnson and Johnson, 2005). These goal structures specify the type
of interdependence toward individual and collective goals, and through this interaction they can
promote or obstruct the goals of others (Johnson and Johnson, 2005). As aforementioned in the
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previous chapters, there are a number of characteristics for interdependence theory including
level of dependence, mutuality of dependence, basis of dependence, covariation of interests and
information sharing (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002)
Since this research is primarily focused on the communication messages between buyers,
the last characteristic is of significant importance. Information sharing between members of the
group can greatly impact the level and nature of interaction (Rusbult and VanLange, 2002).
Incomplete information can create an environment of uncertainty and misunderstanding, leading
to interaction difficulties (Kelley et al. 2002). In the presence of incomplete information,
participants may be unable to effectively interact with others on their team. Emotional messages
can greatly affect others who read those messages (Kelley et al. 2002) and, incomplete
information may hinder one's ability to determine others goals and motives (Rusbult and
VanLange, 2002).
In summary, interdependence theory provides a theoretical foundation for understanding
the combination of social interaction among the group as well as the task-oriented nature. Group
buying represents an activity that is higher along these dimensions thereby requiring higher
levels of interdependence.
Emotional Messages
Emotions are relatively short-lived positive or negative evaluative state that has
neurological and cognitive elements (Lawler and Thye, 1999). From social exchange theory
(Homans, 1958), which assumes self-interested actors will transact with other actors to
accomplish goals they cannot achieve by themselves, researchers have examined the role of
emotions in the social exchange process. Interdependence tasks are a central component of social
exchange process (Lawler and Thye, 1999). There is evidence that suggests that emotions “enter
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and pervade the social exchange process”, and within the process, emotions serve as a signaling
function for group members and bias how members in a group may perceive each other which
could ultimately impact their interaction and decision making (Lawler and Thye, 1999).
The role of emotions as a signaling function is seen as communicating evaluations and
appraisals (Parkinson, 1996). Using appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991) buyer’s appraisal of
situations effects the buyers emotions, which in turn could be conveyed through messages which
in turn affect other buyers impacting their interaction. Buyers in a group-buying auction are
engaged in a joint activity which heightens the sense of collective or group membership, and this
joint activity strengthens social solidarity through shared emotions and feelings, and thus
positive feelings might lead to stronger affective attachment to the group. (Lawler and Thye,
1999).
Some would argue that computer mediated communication (CMC) are unable to convey
emotions. Sproull and Kiesler (1986) stated that CMC suppresses social cues and is a more
impersonal medium. Media richness theory (Deft and Lengel, 1986) provides for the differences
in information processing between the different types of technology based on a scale of richness,
i.e. the ability of the technology to convey information to change understanding in a given time
period. Derks et al. (2007) argue that “emotions are found frequently online as offline”, and
those users of CMC, find different ways to express emotion through the technology more
explicitly to compensate for the lack of normal face-to-face emotional cues.
Impact of Media on Groups
Rha and Widdows (2002) explained the importance of organization and communication
for countervailing power. Technologies such as the Internet can facilitate socialization and allow
people with similar interests and shared values to form virtual communities (Chiua, et al. 2006).
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Technology clearly facilitates communication thereby enhancing the opportunity to organize but
does it enhance the collaboration effect in collective buying, thereby affecting the price
positively for the buyers? Theory of Task, Technology and Fit (TTF) (Goodhue and Thompson,
1995) holds that IT is more likely to have a positive impact on individual performance if the
capabilities of the IT match the tasks that the user must perform. Zigurs and Buckland (1998)
examined TTF in a group decision support setting and focused on the tasks that were performed
by individuals. Task definition is important in determining the best fit for a group decision
support system. Zigurs and Buckland (1998) adapted the aggregated task categories and
dimensions for determining the best fit of technology in a group setting.
Using these task dimensions, the collaborative buying scheme would be defined as a
simple task, since the outcome and solution scheme are singular, and there is no conflicting
interdependence. Simple tasks would therefore be mapped, according to Zigurs and Buckland
(1998), to technology that is high in communication support, low in process structuring and low
in information processing.
In addition to understanding the fit of technology to the particular task, it is important to
assess the attributes of technologies that could better facilitate simple tasks such as collective
buying. Media Synchronicity Theory (Dennis, et al. 2008) helps identify which technologies are
best suited for particular tasks. MST provides a framework for two types of processes,
conveyance and convergence. Conveyance processes are the transmission of a diversity of new
information enabling the receiver to mentally understand the situation being presented (Dennis
et. al 2008). Conveyance processes involve more information processing and more cognitive
processing. In contrast, convergence processes requires less information processing and more
information transmission. In convergence processes, the individuals have a better understanding
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of the situation and require less cognitive processing to reach a decision. Convergence requires
less deliberation, so in situations where individuals have a common understanding, encoding and
decoding familiar information should be faster (Minsky 1986).
Assessment of technologies for use in conveyance and convergence processes therefore
provides a foundation for understanding technological attributes for this research. Media that is
lower in synchronicity is better for convergence processes, while media that is higher in
synchronicity is better for conveyance processes. Therefore, the effect of different attributes of
media and its effects on performance in a collective buying setting is examined.
Finally, although the primary set of tasks could be considered simple, and the set of
technologies attributes could be aligned with convergence processes, it is anticipated that the
process will transition from conveyance to convergence, i.e. buyers who are new to the collective
buying will need more time to adapt to the different buying process and explore the technology
to see how it works. Therefore, initially the actual task is not simple but rather more
“judgmental” (Zigurs and Buckland, 1998) where the outcome and solution scheme is still
singular, but some conflicting interdependence will occur. This would require more information
processing, which would in turn require technology attributes more fitting for a conveyance
process. Over time, however, the level of information processing would fall, as buyers become
more experienced in collective buying, and therefore buyers would tend toward technologies that
are more appropriate for convergence processes.
Communication Messages in Economics
Since Hayek (1947) researchers have tried a number of experiments to determine if price
contains all the information necessary for equilibrium (Smith, 1979). Galbraith (1952) believed
that communication was necessary to counter seller market power. However, the ability for

	
  

118	
  
	
  

consumers to communicate effectively has only been possible due to the Internet and related
technologies (Rha and Widdows, 2002). When buyers are free to communicate, it isn’t certain
exactly what types of messages or frequency of messages they might choose. Emotions, and thus
emotional messages, for example, can bias decision-making (Lerner & Keltner 2001), and types
of emotions, i.e. positive or negative, have been shown to lead to optimism or pessimism in
decision-making (Isen, et al., 1978; Johnson & Tversky, 1983).
Although Galbraith (1952) posited that individual consumers could not coordinate
effectively, the internet could act as a change agent for countervailing power.. As consumers can
exchange information, the influence, i.e. information influence, that it exerts can effect
behavioral buying patterns, or behavior willingness (Park & Lessing, 1977; Ajzen & Fishbein,
1980) In addition, communication between consumers can also lead to normative influences,
such as conformity (Allen, 1965) and herd behavior (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Other messages
from can convey additional information such as the nature of the simulation / game or market,
which could affect performance of the subjects.
Hypothesis Development
The purpose of this study is to examine the message content and its relation to buyer
performance in terms of successful task completion and buyer profit. Thus this study partitions
the communications into two types of messages, emotional, and price based. The literature
review found that emotions do play a significant role in joint activities and that positive emotions
can have a strong moderating effect on performance (Lawler and Thye, 1999). It is believed that
emotional messages can be conveyed through communications (Derks et al. 2007). These
messages will serve to signal intentions. If messages are positive the performance of the group
should increase, and thus buyer profit should increase while time to task completion should
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decrease, i.e. faster successful bids and the reverse will hold true for negative emotions. Thus the
following exploratory hypotheses are developed:

Exploratory Hypothesis 1 (Positive Messages —Buyer-Surplus): Increased levels of positive
messages will tend to increase buyer surplus.
Exploratory Hypothesis 2 (Positive Messages —Task-Completion Hypothesis): Increased
levels of positive messages will tend to expedite successful group task completion.
Exploratory Hypothesis 3 (Negative Messages —Buyer-Surplus): Increased levels of
negative messages will tend to decrease buyer surplus.
Exploratory Hypothesis 4 (Negative Messages —Task-Completion Hypothesis): Increased
levels of negative messages will tend to delay successful group task completion.

Hayek (1947) noted that price itself contains all the information necessary for efficient
markets (1947). However, according to Galbraith (1952) if consumers could exchange
information and coordinate, they could exercise countervailing power. The previous studies
focused on the effect of enabling communication in relation to buyer performance. This notion is
extended to actual price communications to determine if there is an effect based on increased
“directed” or utility oriented messages, i.e. eliminating the noise from spurious messages that
have no bearing on the actual task. Using only the price messages as an independent variable,
this study seeks to examine if an increase in these types of messages increases buyer
performance in the form of higher buyer profits and faster time to task completion. Therefore the
following exploratory hypotheses are developed.
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Exploratory Hypothesis 5 (Price Messages —Buyer-Surplus): Increased levels of price
messages will tend to increase buyer surplus.
Exploratory Hypothesis 6 (Price Messages —Task-Completion Hypothesis): Increased levels
of price messages will tend to expedite successful group task completion.

5.3 Methodology
Experimental Design
An electronic market experiment was created in the laboratory where participants were
asked to coordinate group purchases of a single product from a monopolistic seller. Each
individual buyer has a private, pre-assigned value for the same single product. Consumer
valuations vary across buyers and each buyer needs to buy one unit of the product. The
participants were recruited from an undergraduate student subject pool and were compensated
with course credit. The experiment was conducted over a period of two years from multiple
designs of the experiment. Each experiment had similar attributes. Each experiment had the
presence or absence of a communication channel, and group size of 2,3, or 4, as a measure of
social facilitation, and Time Pressure, which is induced by limiting the auctions to two-and-ahalf minutes, or three-and-a half minutes. These time limits were determined after a number of
pilot runs that have already been conducted. This time window was sufficient for groups to
complete given tasks but short enough to make them feel that they needed to make decision
quickly.
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Procedure
Each session consisted of groups with 2, 4,5, or 8 prospective buyers. Upon entering the
lab, the participants are randomly assigned to computer terminals with a buyer screen for the
buyers. Once the participants are seated, they are asked to review a set of instructions that
explains the electronic group-buying mechanism and the user interface for their specific role as a
buyer. Participants are not told who is a buyer, however, the moderator of the experiment
indicated to each participant that they would be given a set of instructions based on their role as
either a buyer or seller, even though everyone was a buyer. The session consisted of one
extended practice period and ten experimental periods, where buyers worked to coordinate group
offers to the seller. The data from the practice round will be discarded and not used in analysis.
Each regular round lasted 150, two and a half-minutes, or 210 seconds, three and a half minutes.
In the sessions with 2, 4, and 8 buyers, the seller is a participant; however in the sessions
with 5 buyers, the seller is automated. Since the analysis of this study is on the messages
generated by the buyers, the seller function is not as relevant for this study. If the bid price
matches or exceeds the seller price, the bid will be accepted and the buyers will win the auction
at the price of the bid. If the bid is below the “acceptable selling price”, the offer will be rejected,
and buyers can work on a new, improved joint offer if their bid is not accepted.
The buyer screen shows the buyers the assigned willingness-to-pay (WTP) value of the
product they are asked to buy. With the beginning of each round, a buyer can initiate a bid, or
wait and join an existing bid price. When the requisite number of buyers, determined by the
group size manipulation, a group offer was generated and immediately forwarded to the seller for
review. In any case, a new bid price can be proposed at any time. Buyers observe the market by
looking at the current bids, pending offers, and also by learning from declined offers. When a
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transaction occurs, i.e. a seller accepts an offer from the buyer group; the buyer’s profit will be
calculated and shown to the participants. In the treatment with a private communication channel
buyers are able to exchange text messages via an instant message type of communication box.
In each period of the ten repeated rounds of the experiment, the buyers are given different
WTP values, generated randomly, and rotated to buyers sequentially in each period (as detailed
in Appendix B). First, 10 random integer numbers are generated between 25 and 100 from a
uniform distribution. These 10 numbers are then recorded and reused for all of the 10 repeated
rounds for all experimental groups in order to experimentally control for WTP effects. In the
first round of the experiment, the first five numbers are assigned to the five group buyers
sequentially, and in the second round, the next five values, starting from the second number, are
assigned to the buyers sequentially, and so on. This WTP rotation method ensures that every
buyer receives all of the ten generated values over the course of the ten repeated rounds and,
additionally, that for any given round all buyers have also different values.
Measures
Specifically, this study looks at all experimental sessions in which, one experimental
treatment variable, presence of the communication channel, is manipulated. Dependent variables
include the number of price messages, the number of positive messages and the number of
negative messages, while independent variables include group-level profit, measured as average
buyer profit within groups, and group performance, investigated in terms of time for group task
completion. The group task is measured, making a deal with the seller, by analyzing the time the
successful bid was been accepted.
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5.4 Data Analysis

Independent Variables

Message Counts
Positive Messages
Negative Messages
Pricing Messages

Dependent Variables

Buyer profit
Task completion (accepted bid)
Time pressure
Experimental periods (P1, P2, …, P10 = 0 or 1)
Experimental Session

Control Variables
Table 26. Experimental variables
Descriptive analysis

The experiment was carried out with a total of 97 groups. Groups were comprised of 2, 4,
5, and 8 potential buyers. Buyers would be allowed to place a bid on a product, if the requisite
number of buyers agreeing on a price as met. Bids could be placed with 2, 3 or 4 buyers. Data
was collected from each group over 10 rounds of the collective bidding. Out of the 970 rounds
over the 97 groups, 48 groups were provided with a communication channel in which to send
messages to other bidders.
2123 messages were collected over the 480 rounds of bidding from 209 bidders, for an average
of 10.15 messages per buyer. Table 27 shows the number of messages by bidder group size.
Bidder Group size
Groups with Communication (Total
Groups)
Buyers

2
21 (40)

3
11 (21)

4
16 (36)

Total
48 (97)

58

55

96

209

Messages

397

590

1136

2123

Table 27. Message count descriptives
Emotional Messages
The analysis of the message content focused on emotional messages, i.e. positive or
negative, and utility messages, those dealing with price. Two independent raters, graduate
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students, were given the list of messages and asked to rate each message as a positive message or
a negative message, with respect to emotion. Sample messages are provided in table 28 below.
Positive

Negative

1

hey okay

low ball

2

lets keep it up lol

damn you sellers

3

Good start

okdont bid now. anyone

4

wtf? lol

We have to work together!

5

lol

okdont bid now. anyone

6

lmao

theyre money hungry

7

prob loll

ihate 16

8

haha

we're going to lose money

9

ha

DONT CHILL!

10

17 looks beautifull seller :)

let's not buy anything next round

11

^yes!

stop bidding they are maximize profits

Table 28. Examples of emotional messages
After the raters conducted their analysis, Cohen’s Kappa was calculated to examine the
interrater reliability for the positive and negative messages. The interrater reliability for positive
messages was .73, and the reliability measure for negative messages was .70, both of which are
interpreted as “good agreement” according to the rating scale kappa. Once agreement was
determined, the following table summarizes the results.
Coder 1

Coder2

Positive
111
119
Negative
284
328
Table 29. Summary statistics of emotional messages

Combined Reliability
Agreement
86
.73
227
.70

With the combined messages, the goal was to determine the effect of any on average
profit, or time to completion. First, two ANOVA analyses were conducted to see if there were
any differences between the different group sizes, and the average number of positive or negative
messages per buyer in each group (2, 3, 4). The ANOVA analysis found no differences between
the groups for average positive (F=2.76, p=.121) or average negative messages (F=.04, p=.976).
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Using a regression analysis, an examination was conducted to see if the average positive
or negative messages per buyer impacted Average Profit, or Time to Completion. The regression
analysis included the control for the group size. The two regression models are shown below in
Table 30.
Intercept
Groupsize3
Groupsize4
Positive
F
Adj R2
Normality (S-W)

Profit
43.96†
1.155
-17.56
4.70
.899
.000
.86

TTC
144.33**
-44.98
12.48
.46
1.526
.090
.86

Intercept
Groupsize3
Groupsize4
Negative
F
Adj R2
Normality (S-W)

Profit
61.70**
11.64
-12.80
-3.88
1.427
.005
.70

TTC
114.62**
-36.49
11.80
8.5*
4.98**
.314
.70

** - p<.01, * - p<.05, † - p<.10

Table 30. Regression model
The regression analysis shows no relationship between the positive messages and average
profit or time to completion. Thus no evidence of a relationship as suggested by EH1 and EH2
was found. While negative messages appear to have no impact on Average Profit, providing no
evidence for EH3, there does appear to be a significant positive effect between negative
messages and time to completion (t=2.61, p=.015), providing some evidence of a relationship as
described in EH4. This appears to show that the higher the average number of negative messages
per buyer, the longer it takes to reach a successful group bid, controlling for the groups size had
no effect. Negative messages, thus, have an adverse effect on group performance, as Lawler and
Thye (1999) explained.
Price Messages
Continuing to analyze the messages, focus shifted to price messages. As an economic
experiment, it is expected that group bidders might communicate information about prices, or
their private values, in an attempt to coordinate a purchase prices. Analysis on the messages was
first done automatically to remove any messages that did not contain a number. Of the 2123

	
  

126	
  
	
  

messages, 947 messages contained numbers. After careful review by the principal researcher, it
was found that some of the messages with numbers contained acronyms commonly used in
internet chat forums such as “b4”, meaning “before”, or “I h8 this”, meaning “I hate this”. Each
of the messages was reviewed and 63 additional messages were removed for containing
acronyms, common Internet terms containing a number, or only referencing a buyer, such as
“waiting for buyer 1”, and not a price. If a message contained anything that could be understood
as a price, it was kept. Table 31 shows the breakdown of thee messages.
Total Messages
Total Numeric Messages
Messages manually removed
Total Price Messages
Ratio of Price Messages to Total Messages
Ratio of Price Messages to Numeric Messages

Total
2123
947
63
884
.416
.933

Table 31. Summary of price messages

Model 1

Model 2

Profit

Time

Time

Intercept

47.54**

123.32**

116.46**

Groupsize3

17.14

-72.18**

Groupsize4

-14.64

-4.55

PriceMsgs

.38

2.93**

1.712

F

2.045

8.79**

2.65

Adj R

.082

.40

.046

Normality
(Shapiro-Wilk)

.40

.40

.54

2

Table 32. Regression model
As the table shows, almost 42% of all the messages dealt with price, and thus represents
attempts at coordination of task completion as required for this type of interdependence task.
How these price messages and attempts at coordination impact average buyer profit and time to
task completion represents the central piece for this study. A regression model was built to
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determine the effect of these price messages base on the average number of price messages sent
per buyer. Additionally, one control was added, group size, since the study had sessions with 2,
3, and 4 as the buyer groupsize. The results of the regression are compiled in Table 32.
From an average buyer profit perspective, the regression shows that the number of price
messages per buyer has no effect on the average profit level (F=2.045, p=.12). However, when
profit is examined, the results show a strong positive effect, between an increased number of
messages, and an increase in time to completion. Thus no evidence of a relationship described in
EH5 and EH6 was found. The results did suggest an opposite effect of what EH6 described (p
<.05). However, controlling for the groupsize may provide some insight to this result. The
manipulation, in which the buyer group size was set at three, was the only study that had 210
seconds as the time duration, whereas the others were 150 seconds. It is most likely that this
result would be primarily due to the increased time duration. In order to test this, the control was
removed and a regression was run between the price messages per buyer and time to completion.
The result yielded a model that had no significance (F=2.652, p=.113).
Summary of Hypothesis Tests
Positive Emotional Message Effects

Evidence

EH1

(Positive Messages —Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Increased positive messages will tend to
increase buyer surplus

No

EH2

(Positive Messages —Time to Task Completion Hypothesis): Increased positive messages
will tend to speed up Time to Task Completion

No

EH3
EH4

Negative Emotional Message Effects
(Negative Messages —Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Increased negative messages will tend to
No
decrease buyer surplus.
(Negative Messages —Time to Task Completion Hypothesis): Increased negative messages
will tend to delay time to task completion.
Price Message Effects

Yes

EH5

(Price Messages —Buyer-Surplus Hypothesis): Increased price messages will tend to increase
No
buyer surplus.

EH6

(Price Messages —Time to Task Completion Hypothesis): Increased price messages will tend
No
to speed up time to task completion.

Table 33: Summary of Hypotheses
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5.5 Discussion and Limitations
The study combines experimental economics, information systems, emotion theory and
social exchange theory. The study examines the effects of emotional messages and utility
messages in the form of price messages. The study contains 6 exploratory hypotheses, based on
the literature. It is recommended that further development of the hypotheses be conducted.
Price messages were thought to have some importance on performance, since Hayek
(1947) noted that price itself contains all the information necessary, it was believed that there
might be a relationship between performance and messages between buyers that contained price.
However, this was not the case, and therefore, future studies should focus on the overall effect of
possibility that price messages might have more of an impact in different ways in electronic
markets.
While the literature stated that emotional messages should have an effect on group
performance, generally this was not shown to be true. However, there was a significant effect of
negative messages on successful task time completion. The implication of this is that negative
messages may create more hostility and anger toward the group thereby suppressing group
performance in terms of time to task completion. This does support the literature review, in the
sense that as positive messages were posited to increase the social exchange process, negative
messages should hinder that process, which appears to be the case.
It should be noted that although the messages were deemed as positive or negative,
Parkinson (1996) provides taxonomy of emotions and that simply looking at messages in a
positive or negative context may not be enough since emotions are much broader than the two
dichotomous categories used in this study. Additionally, future studies should include scales
during the sessions to determine the emotions of the participants, which could then be analyzed
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within the context of the session and compared to the performance results. In addition, surveys
conducted at the end can serve to validate the overall emotional state of the participants to
determine the effect on overall performance, which could then be compared to the message
content.
This study contributes to the emotional and behavioral economic literature and through
the results, advocates more studies in these messages. The results suggest that emotions do play a
role however it is not very clear how strong of an effect are, and manipulating various elements
of this study could provide more insightful results. Organizations that utilize social commerce
can monitor emotions of participants and thus alter their design according to the results of these
types of studies, specifically from this study, attempting to mitigate negative emotions. While
generally it is believed that emotions play a role, it may be more important to mitigate the
negative emotions. Future research might hold that emotions such as anger, happiness and
sadness might be more predictive of buyer performance and thus should be studied in this
context.
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6. Conclusion
Technology enhances communication in both speed and quantity of information and
when aligned with appropriate tasks can improve decision-making and task performance (Dennis
et al., 2008). Communication mechanisms are a key component of technological advances over
the past decade with an increase in mobility and social media technologies. Coupling the
communication effect with economic effects provides insight into how increased communication
effects performance in terms of buyer profit and time to task completion. This paper examined
the effects of communication on performance in a number of ways and added to the economic
and information technology literature.
Using economic theory as the base for designing electronic markets, the paper created an
electronic market using intra-buyer auction to simulate a social commerce site, where buyers
needed to aggregate bids in an effort to conduct a transaction with a seller, simulating an effort to
counter seller power (Galbraith, 1952). Larger buyer groups should be able to obtain better prices
and extract higher surplus from sellers, and more communication capacity should help buyers
with coordinating their actions. The tradeoff however with larger groups for countering seller
power is the increased coordination required. Leveraging interdependence theory it is believed
that increased communication would positively impact the groups ability to coordinate and
therefore obtain better surplus and be faster in forming bids.
The information technology literature review consistently found that performance
benefits arise in the presence of technology. Malone et al. (1987) advanced the idea that
electronically coordinated B2B markets will tend to increase market transparency and reduce the
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role of intermediaries and Brynjolfsson and Smith (2003) showed empirically that electronically
coordinated B2C markets reduce transaction costs and lead to lower consumer prices. Clemons et
al. (1993) argued that IT-enabled coordination reduces monitoring cost in supply chains and
likely leads to more outsourcing and to the development of strategic partnerships with key
suppliers. Porter (2001) theorized that the adoption of the Internet as a coordination platform
would tend to shift bargaining power from sellers to buyers. Clemons (2008) posited that social
commerce technologies like online communities, recommendation systems, and consumer
ratings and reviews increase consumer’s knowledge about products, availability and prices.
The experiments found that the presence of a communication channel generally had no
effect on buyer surplus. However, one study found that competitive effects had an effect on
buyer surplus in the presence of a communication channel. The interaction effect between the
communication channel and competition appears to be the principal factor for the difference.
When groups were allowed to form dynamically in a different study, i.e. buyers could form
groups of three dynamically, no difference was found in buyer surplus. It appears as though
communication enhance the competitive arousal factor that could lead to better performance.
When the experiments focused on time to task completion, the communication channel
delayed the time to completion, consistent with the literature. The increased communication
focused attention of the buyers’ away form their principle task. Even under the presence of
competition, the results remained the same, and thus a clear relationship between increased level
of communication and delays in time to task completion is confirmed.
The two points above are central to the two prevailing economic theories in this paper,
countervailing power (Galbraith, 1952) and Hayek hypothesis (Hayek, 1947). Countervailing
power posited that countering seller market power could yield larger buyer profits. When group
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size was increased in this study, average buyer profits were not found to change. When
communication channels were added the study found no difference except in the presence of
competition. It was believed that providing increased levels of communication and coordination
would increase buyer surplus, according to countervailing power; however, it appears as though
this is not the case. Hayek stated that price was the only thing necessary for efficient market
operation and thus the studies here lend support to the previous studies that have confirmed this
in different ways.
Adding to the collective knowledge of the literature, this study also used social network
analysis to determine if communication channels altered the structure of the network. Although,
there was no difference between the groups in terms of buyer surplus structure, the
communication channel did have a slight effect on the structure in terms of the betweenness of
the network. When actors act as gatekeepers between other actors in the network the time to
completion decreased, because these actors lie between the other actors and thus could be an
indicator of their participation. Thus, the betweenness may be telegraphing the behavior of key
individuals who are acting as conduits of information through their use of the communication
mechanism.
It is important to note however, specifically, that the network structure found that
networks with lower betweenness tended to take longer in forming successful bids, although this
was a weak relationship. These information gatekeepers, with or without communication, could
in essence be slowing down the group overall. It isn’t certain why this is however.
Additionally, while the presence of the communication channel didn’t affect the degree
of the network, degree does affect the buyer surplus. Networks with lower degree tended to have
higher average profits and slower time to task completion. This is interesting because it suggests
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that when the groups are well connected, i.e. wheel or all-channel pattern (Freeman, 1979),
average profits increase in spite of the fact that the groups are slower, strong support. Further
studies should examine this relationship more closely. It was also found that lower closeness
actually aided in the speed of task to completion, contrary to what was believed. This is also
interesting because it suggest that the closer the nodes are to each other the faster they will
perform, even though it might be more complex to coordinate.
Finally, the study focused on the nature of the messages. It was believed from the
literature that emotions could play a significant role in the success or failure of the buyers’
performance. No effect was found with respect to buyer surplus, which confirms the long body
of literature suggesting the rational choice theory guides efficient market behavior. However, it
was found that negative messages were significantly related to slower time to task completion.
Thus when buyers were negatively oriented, they may have lost focus or purposefully choose to
delay their actions, possibly, but not at the expense of losing.
The notion that price is all that is required for market efficiency was further examined in
the communication channel. It was believed that an additional mechanism in which buyers could
communicate price might be beneficial. However, no effect was found between increased
communication messages and buyers’ surplus or time to task completion.
The studies presented above add to the body of literature in a number of ways. First, it
confirms previous findings, that price is the most essential component in economic markets.
Electronic markets are not different in this respect. It further validates that increases in-group
size do not necessarily result in greater profits. Communication complicates group performance
by introducing a layer of complexity. While possibly providing a richer experience, the buyer
must absorb different information and translate this information, therefore it refocuses the buyer
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from the principal task at hand. Task Technology Fit may provide some insight into why this
occurs, and it would align with Hayek. Increased levels of communication are not necessarily a
fit in economic markets because the price is conveying the same information with less noise or
less opportunity for misunderstanding. The result is that technologies that increased
communication may not be effective in electronic markets under certain conditions for economic
surplus, but communication definitely plays a role in the ability of groups to coordinate, an the
type of communication may have an effect on individual buyers regardless of the structure of the
group.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Experimental Flowchart
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Appendix B: WTP Value Assignment Scheme

7.7.1: WTP Values: 10 numbers, randomly generated from U(25, 100)
V1

V2

V3

V4

V5

V6

V7

V8

V9

V10

7.7.2: WTP Rotation Method
Larger Group

	
  

Smaller Group

Round

Buyer 1

Buyer 2

Buyer 3

Buyer 4

Buyer 1

Buyer 2

1

V1

V2

V3

V4

V1

V2

2

V2

V3

V4

V5

V2

V3

3

V3

V4

V5

V6

V3

V4

4

V4

V5

V6

V7

V4

V5

5

V5

V6

V7

V8

V5

V6

6

V6

V7

V8

V9

V6

V7

7

V7

V8

V9

V10

V7

V8

8

V8

V9

V10

V1

V8

V9

9

V9

V10

V1

V2

V9

V10

10

V10

V1

V2

V3

V10

V1
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Appendix C: Instructions

Example Instructions for Buyers
General Overview
You will be presented with one item to place a bid. Each product has a specific value to you. A
small time cost is assessed to you as the round progresses. During each round you will try to
acquire each of the items for the best (lowest) possible price. You must work with other buyers
to purchase the product. It requires two buyers to agree on a price before the seller can accept an
offer. Your goal is to generate as much cumulative profit as possible, which is equal to the values
of the products minus the sum of amounts you pay for them and your time costs. Each round will
last two and a half minutes. There will be one practice followed by a number of “real” rounds.
The total time for the entire exercise will be approximately one hour.
Bidding Rules
Any buyer may submit a bid. You may join a bid that is no greater than the value of the item.
You may submit a new bid as long as it is greater than the highest bid. Start your bidding low to
maximize potential profit. New bids can only be done in increments of 1; therefore they can be 1
dollar higher than the maximum bid or 1 dollar lower than the minimum bid. Once you join a bid
you will not be able to remove yourself from that offer. Once two bidders join an offer, the bid is
automatically submitted to the seller. If the value of the item drops below the current bid price,
the offer will be removed. The value of an item may be different for each buyer.
Making Money
The profit you earn is equal to the value of the item bought, the bid you submit for the item,
minus the time cost you spend for it. For example, if “item A” is worth $90 to you and you won
the item at the end of the auction with a joint bid of $65, and your time cost spent is $5, you will
earn a profit of ($90 - $65) - $5 = $20
Your total game profit will be equal to the total of all your ten individual round profits
Key Summary Points
• Your goal is to make money
• You have a cost associated with the time you spend in the auction.
• Keep a close watch on the clock especially as it counts down to the end
• Make sure you work with other buyers to get the best possible price.
• Remember you need at least two buyers to make an offer
• Start your bidding low to give yourself the best possible profit
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Instructions for Sellers (Small Groups)
General Overview
You will be presented with two units of one item that you want to sell in an auction. You have a
small cost associated with the time you spend in the auction. During each round you will try to
sell your item for the highest possible price. Your goal is to generate as much profit as possible,
which is equal to the price at which you sell the item minus the time cost you spend for it. Each
round will last two and a half minutes. There will be one practice round and a number of “real”
rounds. The total time for the entire exercise will be approximately one hour.
Bidding Rules
Your product is automatically entered into the auction allowing bidders to submit bids, which
you may accept. A bid will only be submitted to you when 2 buyers join the offer. You may
choose to accept the bid at anytime or allow the bid to expire. The auction will end once you
accept an offer or at the end of, 150 seconds (two and a half minutes).
Making Money
The round profit you earn is equal to the highest offer you accept for the item minus the time
cost for the item. For example, if the offer you accept is $90 at the end of the auction, and your
time cost is $10,
you will earn a profit of $90 - $10 = $80. Your total game profit will be equal to the total of all
your round profits
Key Summary Points
• Your goal is to make money
• Try and get the largest profit possible
• You have a cost associated with the time you spend in the auction.
• Keep a close watch on the clock especially as it counts down to the end.
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Appendix D: Experimental Screens Study 1 & 2
Seller Screen

Buyer Screen without Communication Box

Buyer Screen with Communication Box
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Appendix E: Buyer Screen (Study 3)
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